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Il Dipartimento di Studi Politici ha carattere interdisciplinare e nasce dal
progetto di studiare in modo integrato il mondo della politica in tutti i suoi
aspetti: dalla riflessione teorica e storica sulla formazione delle idee e delle
dottrine politiche, all’analisi comparata dei sistemi politici e delle forme di
democrazia nelle società contemporanee, sullo sfondo dei processi di globa-
lizzazione e di trasformazione delle relazioni internazionali.
Il Dipartimento si è costituito l’8 novembre del 1982, per iniziativa di un
gruppo di studiosi che intendevano raccogliere e sviluppare la tradizione di
studi e ricerche fondata da maestri come Norberto Bobbio, Luigi Firpo e
Alessandro Passerin d’Entrèves, che dalla metà degli anni cinquanta aveva tro-
vato sede nell’Istituto di Scienze Politiche “Gioele Solari”, nucleo della futura
Facoltà di Scienze Politiche e successivamente disciolto in conseguenza della
legge istitutiva dei dipartimenti universitari. In esso sono confluiti filosofi, stori-
ci, politologi e sociologi, che al di là del proprio ambito specialistico sono
accomunati dall’interesse unitario per l’approfondimento della politica. 
All’interno del Dipartimento si possono distinguere varie aree di ricerca. La
prima di esse concerne lo studio del pensiero politico in prospettiva storica, dai
classici del pensiero antico e medioevale alle ideologie e dottrine politiche con-
temporanee. Una seconda area, di carattere politologico e sociologico, riguar-
da lo studio delle forme di stato e di governo, il funzionamento dei regimi poli-
tici, le trasformazioni della democrazia, la comunicazione politica e i media.
Una terza area è dedicata allo studio delle relazioni internazionali e ai pro-
blemi della pace. Una quarta area si occupa dei problemi connessi all’inte-
grazione europea e allo studio del pensiero e dei movimenti federalisti. Una
quinta area si occupa dei problemi dello sviluppo e della storia dei paesi non
europei, dall’America Latina all’Asia e all’Africa.
Il Dipartimento di Studi politici cura la pubblicazione di una collana di
working papers. Lo scopo della collana è di far conoscere tempestivamente
alla comunità scientifica ipotesi di lavoro, interventi, materiali di ricerca, in
attesa di pubblicazione o giunti ad una fase finale di elaborazione.
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Abstract
di Luca Ozzano
La politica estera dell’Uzbekistan dall’indipendenza (1991) fino agli
eventi legati alla guerra in Afghanistan (autunno 2001), condotta tramite
un modello di analisi del decision-making, rivela molti aspetti di un diffi-
cile percorso di state-building e di transizione dal comunismo: il disconti-
nuo processo di allontanamento dalla Russia, accompagnato da tentativi
di avvicinamento agli USA coronati da successo solo dopo l’11 settembre
2001; le strategie seguite per superare difficoltà economiche (le quali,
insieme a mire egemoniche uzbeke sull’intera Asia Centrale, hanno por-
tato diverse volte sull’orlo di un conflitto regionale); il problematico rap-
porto con l’Islam in un Paese circondato da forze fondamentaliste; l’irrile-
vanza della società civile e politica e delle organizzazioni internazionali
e non governative nei destini della regione.
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Abstract
by Luca Ozzano
The foreign policy of independent Uzbekistan (from 1991 to the events
connected to the Afghan campaign of autumn 2001), carried on through
a decision-making analysis model, shows several features of a harsh path
of state-building and transition from Communism: the discontinuous
process of emancipation from Russia, matched by attempts of approach-
ing the USA (crowned by success only after 9/11); the strategies pursued
to overcome serious economic problems (which, added to projects of
Uzbek hegemony over the whole of Central Asia, led several times to the
edge of a regional war); the uneasy relation with Islamic movements in a
country surrounded by fundamentalist forces; and the irrelevance of civil
society and international organizations and NGOs in the Central Asian
affairs.
dedicato a Cristina
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CHAPTER 1
Central Asia, in its quality as link and fixed
course between East and West, Asia and Europe,
for centuries represented an essential playground
in what today’s scholars call ‘geopolitical dynam-
ics’. Here the Silk Road, route of nearly all East-West commercial contacts
passed, the Greeks of Alexander the Great and Indians met, Arabs and
the Chinese fought in Talas, Tamerlane set the Capital of his Empire in
Samarkand, the United Kingdom and Russia confronted each other in
what the former called a ‘Great Game’, the latter a ‘Tournament of
Shadows’. 1 However, when in the 1860s the last pieces of the region (the
emirates of Bukhara, Khiva and Khojand, most of which are included in
contemporary Uzbekistan) were conquered by the Soviet Union, an iron
curtain fell on Central Asia. During the following decades the region was
incorporated into the Russian Empire more and more closely, while the tra-
ditional ties with the rest of the Muslim world were cut, and the Silk Road,
for the first time in centuries, was interrupted. The Soviet Rule did not bring
more freedom to the land of Central Asia, mostly regarded as a deposit of
raw materials and natural resources, and the fittest place to forcefully set-
tle uneasy populations. Quite surprisingly, just in this period, contempo-
rary Central Asian peoples were born – when the Soviets, in the frame-
work of Stalin’s nationalities theory, decided what people could be repre-
sented in an eponymous territory, drew the borders, and codified lan-
guages and literatures that now belong to the new independent Central
Asian Republics.
It would be obvious to observe that during the ‘130 years of Russian
rule’ (as Allworth defined them) 2 Central Asia did not play any significant
international role; moreover, until the 1950s, the region was not repre-
sented even in Moscow’s central institutions. When independence came to
the region after the attempted Moscow putsch of August 1991, it was
INTRODUCTION
1 Ahmed Rashid, Talebani. Islam, Petrolio e il Grande Scontro in Asia Centrale, Feltrinelli,
Milano, 2001
2 Edward Allworth, Ed., Central Asia: 130 Years of Russian Dominance, Duke University
Press, 1994
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unexpected and, generally, unwanted by the leaders of the Republics. They
well knew the political inexistence and military and economic weakness of
their Countries, mostly relying on their total dependence on Russia and on
interrepublican exchanges. In this period, not many observers believed in
the survival of these new political entities: it was a common opinion that
they could soon, de facto where not de jure, be reabsorbed by the former
‘elder brother’, the Russian Federation. Anyway, after the independence of
most European colonies in the 1960s, it was the first time that the world
faced the birth of such a huge number of new States. 
Unexpectedly, the leadership of the Republics everywhere (except
Tajikistan) managed to build the embryo of a proper nation-state without
widespread conflicts. Therefore, regional powers such as Turkey and Iran,
and, although belatedly, Europe and the USA started to understand the
geostrategical importance of the region. In a few years, all of them, includ-
ing China and, again, Russia, came to see Central Asia as a unique
opportunity to expand their spheres of influence, control strategically rele-
vant mineral and natural resources (from oil and gas, to gold and urani-
um), find new markets for their products and allies against their own ene-
mies, quickly creating a complex of new political and economic relations
that Ahmed Rashid baptized ‘New Great Game’. 3 Scholars, once the sub-
ject was noticed, interpreted the region as a ‘gray zone’ or ‘empty space’
where no power could dominate absolutely, 4 a ‘fault zone’ among Islamic,
Western and Orthodox civilizations, 5 and several other ways.
Nevertheless, the new States proved more eager for investment and con-
crete projects of development than for ideologies and theories.
The situation in Central Asia after 10 years of independence, when this
research was going to find its conclusion, saw the new Republics still in
deep difficulties, not only because of the ongoing problematic process of
state-building, but also for a serious economic crisis, threatening Islamic
incursions, renewed Russian hegemonic ambitions, and the almost dicta-
torial rule exerted in most cases by their leaderships. However, not all the
Central Asian Republics had the same fate, and therefore they do not
present an identical profile to the international relations analyst. On the
contrary, each one of the new States is provided with its own peculiar ori-
3 Rashid, op. cit.
4 Fabrizio Vielmini, “Dal Turan all’Eurasia”, Limes No. 3, 1999, p. 152
5 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order,
Penguin, 1997
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entations and trends, and each one would be an interesting field of study
for a political scientist. Tajikistan, after a bloody civil war and years of
turmoil, has recently become one of the first States in the World to incor-
porate a significant Islamic force into a democratic system; Kyrgyzstan,
quickly opening to the market and to the western model of presidential
democracy, has recently acceded to the WTO and was for a long time
indicated as a positive model of democratic development; Turkmenistan
has fallen under the picturesque rule of a personal dictator filling with his
image every corner of the Country; Kazakhstan, with a Russian minority
equaling almost the population of the eponymous nationality, has become
an interesting experiment of interethnic cohabitation.
Nevertheless, and international analyst willing to study a State that can
conduct an unprejudiced foreign policy, resist to the pressures of the Great
Powers, and exercise some political and military influence on its neighbors
would probably choose Uzbekistan, as was done for this research. The
reasons for such a preeminence belong to different fields. First of all, there
are obvious geographical and demographic reasons: Uzbekistan is a
large Country (about the size of France) and is strategically situated in the
middle of the region, not only bordering the other four Central Asian
Countries, but also Afghanistan. It is by far the most populated Country in
the region, and the less ethnically fragmented, which also means less influ-
ence of regional factions than in the neighboring Republics. Its territory,
moreover, includes nearly all the main historical centers of the region, par-
ticularly the towns of Bukhara and Samarkand, and was the focal point of
the main dynasties flourishing in Central Asia, from the Timurids, to the
Shaybanids, and the Emirates of Khiva and Bukhara.
The Russians recognized this historical role by elevating Tashkent as
their military and administrative center in Central Asia. Also under the
Soviet rule, Uzbekistan was recognized as a primus inter pares in the
region by Moscow, which assigned to the Republic most of the regional
institutions, from the Central Asian Military District to the Muftiyya
(Spiritual Directorship). Uzbekistan was also the most represented of the
five Republics in the USSR central institutions. All these factors cooperated
to provide the Country with vital infrastructures and a political experience
which proved essential to its success as an independent State: it is possi-
ble to say that, in the problematic context of contemporary Central Asia,
Uzbekistan was the only Country with comparative advantages able to
allow it to perform a significant role also at the international level. This was
in fact the purpose of the ambitious President Karimov who, after a peri-
od of necessary restructuring and State-building, began an assertive for-
eign policy trying to achieve independence from Moscow (both through
political freedom and economic self-sufficiency) and to reach close coop-
eration with the NATO security apparatus, while firmly opposing every
Islamist penetration. The importance of Uzbekistan as a pivotal State in
Central Asia was, in fact, recognized (after some reluctance owing to its
bad record in human rights), also by the USA, first as an “island of sta-
bility” in Central Asia, and, later, as the privileged partner in the region
(the events of Fall 2001 just represented a turning point of a trend already
testified by international analysts some years before). 6
In short, independent Uzbekistan today represents a very interesting
testing ground in relation to several primary international issues: 
• The penetration (economic, political and, now, also military) of the
USA in the Country, that will probably impinge upon the traditional
hegemonic role of Russia in the Region.
• The quality of Uzbekistan as a frontier State against the penetration
of Islamic radicalism and terrorist organizations, which constantly
try to infiltrate through the borders of the Country.
• The role (especially as a close US ally) that the Country will play
among the weaker neighboring Countries, all including significant
ethnic Uzbek minorities.
• The ‘New Great Game’ regarding the region’s natural resources
and their development, that will probably be renewed by the
reopening of the ‘Afghan route’ for pipelines after the fall of the
Taliban regime.
• The strategic geographic position that makes Uzbekistan a key actor
in every policy of control of arms and unconventional materials
smuggling, drug trafficking, and nuclear proliferation.
This research tried to give some interpretations on Uzbekistan’s foreign
policy orientation by analyzing a cluster of decisions taken by its leader-
ship during its first ten years of independent existence (from September
1991 to December 2001). The analytical framework adopted for this
research is the model developed by Michael Brecher (that, unlike other
patterns of analysis, has been tested by the author in his monumental
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6 Fabrizio Vielmini, “Il ‘Grande Gioco’ Anglo-Americamo in Eurasia”, Limes No. 5, 2000,
pp.231-246; see also the findings in the last chapter of this paper
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analysis in two volumes about Israel’s Foreign Policy, 7 and, recently, by
Valter Coralluzzo in his book examining the Post-War Italian Foreign
Policy 8 ). The model is first of all inspired to the systemic analysis of poli-
tics (first developed by David Easton). Brecher, in particular, considers a
foreign policy system as a flux of decisions produced by a network of
structures and institutions, having specific effects on the environment and,
also, a feedback effect on the system. To describe it, he makes an interest-
ing synthesis of policy analysis models, with the contribution given by
schools such as the bureaucratic politics (taking into account also the influ-
ence of the institutional apparatus and of the psychology of decision mak-
ers on decisions). This synthesis, developed with reference to the cognitive
behaviorism of H. and M. Sprout and K. Boulding, 9 singles out the
Operational Environment and the Psychological Environment constituting
a foreign policy system.
The Operational Environment, existing independently from the actors’
perceptions, defines the boundaries of the foreign policy decision-making
process. The behavior of decision-makers is thus determined and commit-
ted by a wide number of factors, gathered by Brecher around the follow-
ing 10 variables (half of them relating to the international environment, the
others to the domestic environment of the Country analyzed):
1. Global System (G) – “the total web of relationships among all
actors within the international system (states, blocs, organizations)”. 10 In
the present work, given the marginality of Uzbekistan (at least before
2001) in global dynamics, the variable Global System has solely been
used as an indicator of the influence of international organizations on
decisions.
2. Regional System (R) – “an intermediate level of interaction between
the global system and the relations between any two states”, characterized
most of all by: “delimited scope with primary stress on a geographic
region; at least three actors; objective recognition” by external actors, and
7 Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel : Setting, Images, Process, London,
Oxford University Press, 1972; Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy, London ; Melbourne ;
Delhi, 1974
8 Valter Coralluzzo, La Politica Estera dell’Italia Repubblicana (1946-1992). Modello di
Analisi e Studio di Casi, Franco Angeli, Milano, 2000
9 cit. in Coralluzzo, op. cit.
10 Michael Brecher, Blema Steinberg, and Janice Stein, “A framework for research on for-
eign policy behavior”, Conflict Resolution, Vol. XIII, N. 1, p. 82
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self-identification as “a distinctive community, region, or segment of the
global system”. 11
3. Other Regional Systems (OR) – A variable testing the influence of
other regional systems, of which a state can also be part, since “states may
be members of one subordinate system, more than one, or none at all”. 12
4. Dominant Bilateral Relation (DB) – “the total pattern of interactions
between any state and a superpower or preeminent actor in the global
system”. 13
5. Other Bilateral Relations (B) – “the total pattern of interactions
between any two states except for relations involving superpowers or pre-
eminent powers within the global system”. 14
6. Military Capability (M) – “the ability to wage war or to deter other
states from attacking”; a variable taking into account “the geography, the
general level of technology, military manpower, financial resources avail-
able for defense, and weaponry”. 15
7. Economic Capability (E) – “the total of all material and human
resources available to the state for external behavior. These range from
natural resources […] through industrial plant to scientific and technical
skills”. 16
8. Political System (PS) – including “the political institutions and con-
stitutional matrix in which authoritative decisions are made”, and “various
traits of the political system which may influence the decision process in
foreign policy: the type of political regime […]; the character of the party
system […]. 17
9. Interest Groups (IG) – Groups within the internal sector of the oper-
ational environment which perform “two distinct functions […]: they com-
municate information about the environment to the decision-making elite
and […] advocate policies to those who wield authority in the system”. 18
10. Competing Elites (CE) – “which vie for authority to make political
11 Id., p. 83
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id., pp. 83-84
16 Id., p. 84
17 Id.
18 Id.
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decisions in the system”. Unlike interest groups, which tend to advocate
specific demands, they “also propose alternative sets of foreign policy
demands”. 19 In this work, the variable tests the influence on decisions of
the Islamic groups (as well as Coralluzzo did in his book with the influ-
ence of the Communist Party on Italy’s foreign policy 20) while the activity
of the non-Islamic banned Parties is included in the variable Political
System.
Since the decision-making élite members take every decision “in accor-
dance to their perception of reality”, their Psychological Environment is
also essential. It comprises what Brecher calls Attitudinal Prism (a filter
through which élites see the reality, comprising both societal and person-
ality factors), and their consequent Images of the operational environment
and of the single issues. While the Operational Environment must be pri-
marily studied through academic and journalistic sources, the analysis of
the Psychological Environment is more complex. As prescribed by Brecher,
it first relies on explicit articulations of their images provided by the élite
(as the writings by Uzbekistan’s President Karimov used in this study).
When articulated Images are not available, they can be deduced from
“other decisions that are made under comparable conditions”, 21 from a
“composite boby of assessments of the decision-makers’ motivations” 22
and, eventually, “from the known content of the corresponding segment of
the Operational Environment ”. 23
Moreover, the foreign policy decisions examined in this paper are clas-
sified according to the four issue areas fixed by Brecher:
1. Political – Diplomatic (PD)
2. Military – Security (MS)
3. Economic – Monetary (EM)
4. Cultural – Status (CS)
In this paper, the decisions taken into account are, however, gathered
according to a criterion of contiguity of subject/sphere of activity in four
different chapters. The first deals with some crucial decisions taken in the
first years of independence; the second with Central Asian policies (espe-
19 Id., p. 85
20 Coralluzzo, op. cit.
21 Brecher, Steinberg and Stein, cit., p. 89
22 Id.
23 Id.
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cially about the Tajik Civil War); the third with policies involving extra-
regional actors; the fourth with decisions taken during the 2001 Afghan
War.
Every decision’s analysis begins with a paragraph treating the main
variables involved in it (either crucial or relevant according to their degree
of importance). Partially modifying the Model proposed by Brecher (along
with the interpretation given by Professor Coralluzzo) the aspects of the
input privileged here are the ones relating to the Psychological
Environment (although with the limitations given by the sources available),
that is, the presumed interpretation given to the situation by the decision-
makers. The second paragraph in every decision is later devoted to the
description of the flow of events leading to and preceding the decision. The
last one summarily describes the implementation of the decision and its
output, also providing (as an innovation to the model motivated by the
specificity of the Central Asian context where all the Countries often had
to deal with the same issues in the same period) a comparative perspec-
tive with decisions on the same issues taken by the leadership of the other
four Republics of the region (also in order to preserve a comparative per-
spective that originally was one of the purposes of this research).
The final findings of the study present an analysis (both qualitative and
quantitative) trying to provide an explicative (and, as far as possible, pre-
dictive) pattern about the degree of influence of the 10 variables in foreign
policy decisions. Partial analyses will also deal with the variables involved
in decisions belonging to different periods, and different issue areas of
decision.
While reading this paper and its findings, it is however important to
take into account that it was part of a much wider work, still unpublished,
which also included a detailed description of Uzbekistan’s operational and
psychological environments – explaining, for example, why President
Karimov can be considered the only relevant decision-maker of the
Country. 24
In the whole of this work there are several elements of novelty standing
against the existing literature. First of all, Uzbekistan’s foreign policy was
rarely treated in monographic works, and never (in the huge amount of
24 Readers looking for more information can easily found what they need by consulting the
texts mentioned in the bibliography – especially the precious works written by Annette Bohr
and Olivier Roy – or, if they want, by contacting the author of this paper at the address
lucaozzano@yahoo.it.
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essays examined) adopting a formal pattern of study. Several decisions
treated, for example, were just mentioned by scholars as facts, without try-
ing to provide comprehensive explanations. This result has also been pos-
sible thanks to a wide use of internet sources.
Among the problems faced while preparing and developing the work,
the biggest was undoubtedly represented by the sources. First of all, the
discipline studying Central Asian international relations is very recent, sim-
ply because until 1991 the Republics were not part of the international
context. Therefore, the literature of the Soviet times analyzed them mainly
in a domestic (historical, cultural and sociological) perspective, that today
does not prove very useful to the international relations analyst. Moreover,
several works widely considered as ‘classics’ were, in the opinion of the
author of this work, overestimated, often presenting old materials not
updated for decades. A second aspect of the problem is that, also after
independence, Central Asia has been studied for a long time only as a
whole, with limited attention paid to the single constituent Republics. Only
in the late 1990s, monographic works on the single Countries began to
appear in a limited number (I was able to get some relevant sources thanks
to a period of study spent in Fall 2001 at the Erasmus Universiteit of
Rotterdam – The Netherlands).
As for the news and journalistic sources, the problems were also sig-
nificant. First of all, since the Country has been undergoing a severe cen-
sorship regime since at least 1992-93, there are almost no interesting
sources available coming from the Country. The other sources available in
English on the Internet are much more reliable, 25 but rarely refer to events
of the first half of the 1990s. I have filled voids exactly following Brecher’s
instructions: first of all making use of statements about other similar deci-
sions (the book Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century 26
written by President Karimov proved essential), and the corresponding
segments of the operational environment – in addition, of course, to some
authoritative opinions available in the literature.
The readers of the work will surely find other graphic versions of sev-
eral names of places and people. This fact does not only depend on the
double (Uzbek/Russian) version used for many names, but also on the
25 See for example the Web Sites http://www.rferl.org; http://www.eurasianet.org; and
http://www.cacianalyst.org
26 1996, from the Web Site http://www.gov.uz
problems given by the ongoing transition of Uzbekistan to the Latin
Alphabet, and, of course, on the different methods of transliteration.
When dealing with relatively famous names, I used the most common ver-
sion of them; otherwise, I made the choice following a criterion of analo-
gy with the most common ones.
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CHAPTER 2
The Creation of a State
This chapter gathers a cluster of particularly
significant decisions, taken by President Karimov
and his entourage in the early years of
Uzbekistan’s independence. While, in fact, later decisions prove helpful to
analyze the path taken by the Republic’s foreign policy, with its orientation
and changes, the ones presented here could be assessed as ‘founding’.
They deal with subjects such as the introduction of a national Army, a
national currency, and an alphabet different from Russia’s Cyrillic.
Therefore, they cannot be seen solely as foreign policy stances, but they
must be considered as essential steps – although in different issue areas –
in the way which led Uzbekistan to become an independent Country. They
entailed difficult choices, often taken when the situation did not allow any
alternative, and without great hopes of success. Nevertheless, in absence
of any of them, Uzbekistan could not have developed as a real sovereign
Country.
It is also important to note that the decisions examined here were
taken in a political and social environment which was significantly dif-
ferent from that of the following years: Karimov’s power had not yet con-
solidated, and both political opposition and a turbulent civil society were
still present and active in the Country – which also explains the relevance
of variables that became less important in the decisions of the following
years.
A) Variables Involved
Among the crucial variables determining this
strategical decision (and several others, both
strategical and tactical, which preceded and fol-
lowed it), a place of preeminence is of course
occupied by Military Capability. The existence and independence of a
Country’s national army is, in fact, a universally recognized attribute of its
sovereignty; Uzbekistan’s president Karimov confirmed this rule, claiming
for the establishment of the Uzbek Army immediately after his popular
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1. INTRODUCTION
2. ESTABLISHING A
NATIONAL ARMY
(JULY 1992 – MS)
election as Uzbekistan’s President in 1991. 27 However, what allowed him
to call for a national defensive system before all other Central Asian
Republics was his people’s readiness to accept it, mainly determined by the
activity of more or less organized Interest Groups. According to Critchlow,
at that time “Karimov and other Uzbek Government leaders were unhap-
py” because “popular political pressures could no longer be ignored” after
the so-called ‘recruits murder scandal’, thus helping “to move Uzbekistan
a step closer to genuine sovereignty”. 28 Moreover, 1992 was also the year
of the massive students demonstrations demanding democratization. Very
likely, Karimov established the Army (and especially the National Guard)
also to be able to control social unrest.
A similar role, but less critical, was probably played by Competing
Elites, represented by the Islamic movements: Karimov, in fact, made his first
speech supporting the national Army after an electoral campaign weighti-
ly marked by Islamic insurgencies and demands. In the case of Namangan,
for example, Karimov was not only forced to interrupt his campaign, but
even to call for the help of the opposition movement Birlik: these facts could
well have convinced him of the necessity of a better controlled security
apparatus. Another variable with some relevance is undoubtedly Russia’s
role (Dominant Bilateral), not only in its feared quality of potential hegemon
in Central Asia. Some scholars also interpret the final decision about the
establishment of the Uzbek Army as a reaction to the same decision taken
by the Russian federation. 29 Even in this case, as we will see, decisive tac-
tical decisions had already been taken by the Uzbek leadership, whose will
was anyway evident: thus, this variable cannot be considered crucial.
Another relevant input to Karimov could have been the aim to create a
Central Asian defense alliance of independent Armies, presented by
Karimov during his speech of 14 January 1992 at the Supreme Soviet,
probably in opposition to the Slavic bloc projected then by some former
Soviet leaders (Regional and Other Regional).
B) Decisional Flow
The path toward the formation of the Uzbek army probably began in
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27 Robert V. Barylski, “Central Asia and the Post-Soviet Military System”, Central Asia
Monitor n. 6, 1992
28 James Chritchlow, Nationalism in Uzbekistan: a Soviet Republics’s Road to Sovereignty,
Westview Press, Boulder CO, 1991
29 C. Bacarrère-Bécane, and Elisabeth Sieca-Kozlowski, “L’emergence des armées post-
soviétiques: le cas de l’Ouzbékistan”, from the web site http://perso.club-internet.fr
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1989, when public opinion all over the Soviet Union discovered the issue
of the mistreatment of the non-Russian recruits in the multiethnic Soviet
Army. Several Uzbek soldiers, in particular, were allegedly killed in
revenge for the recent ethnic riots in the Ferghana Valley. The press, and
in particular the movement Birlik, channeled the popular anger, and mas-
sive demonstrations were held in Tashkent; in May 1990 the Council of
Ministers of Uzbekistan (already headed by Karimov) issued a decree lim-
iting the conditions for military service of the Uzbek recruits outside
Central Asia. Undoubtedly, this was a bland compromise, that did not
calm the people completely, also because of the action of the new nation-
alist movements. 30
The next step was made one year later when, just one week after inde-
pendence was declared, Uzbekistan established a Ministry for Defense
Affairs, taking some of the functions of the USSR Ministry of Defense. The
Central Asian leaders, however, meeting on 13 December in Ashgabat
(capital of Turkmenistan), called for a united strategical command among
the former Soviet Countries, but did not address the fate of the conven-
tional forces. The situation remained officially uncertain until the Alma-Ata
meeting of 21 December (reconstituting the Community of Independent
States – CIS – with the non-Slavic Countries as equal founding members),
establishing a united strategical command under Marshall Shaposhnikov,
though recognizing the right of every member to form its own national
Army. The Russian federation further proposed to the Countries of Central
Asia to limit their forces to lightly armed republican guards, while assign-
ing all other functions to the CIS. While other leaders hesitated, Karimov
made his opinion clear in his address to the Supreme Soviet on 14
January 1992, indicating his intention to establish a national Army, and
proposing moreover a Central Asian federation of National Armies (that
could later make an alliance both with the CIS and with the Russian fed-
eration). 31
The first act made by Karimov to concretize this intention of his was the
creation, in the same month, of the National Guard, based on Ministry of
Internal Affairs troops; some days later, the Supreme Soviet placed mili-
tary units and schools located in the Country under Uzbekistan’s jurisdic-
tion. Contextually, Karimov signed a decree to establish border guards
under the authority of the Uzbek National Security Service, and subordi-
30 Chritchlow, op. cit., pp. 157-165
31 Barylski, cit.
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nated CIS border guards to this new authority. The leadership also quick-
ly moved to recall the Uzbek personnel serving in other Countries, either
outside the CIS or with their own national Armies. 32 In May, it was decid-
ed that the Uzbek recruits had to do their military service only inside the
Country, leaving to their own discretion the possibility to serve in the CIS
territories; Russian citizens were also forbidden to serve in the Uzbek
Army. 33 These were only the first steps toward a decisive de-russification
of the Uzbek Army, to be realized in the following years. In March, anoth-
er Decree by Karimov declared the number of former Soviet troops in
Uzbekistan to exceed requirements, abolishing the Soviet Turkestan
Military District (headquartered in Tashkent), and establishing a proper
Ministry of Defense. 34
All was already decided, at least informally, but the creation of an offi-
cial Army in the Country. In May all hesitations fell, when, during the same
week, Yeltsin decided that “the time had come to play the Russia card”. He
proclaimed himself acting Minister of Defense for the Russian Federation
and promulgated the formation of the Russian Army, 35 while the Tashkent
Treaty of 15 May distributed the former Soviet troops and equipment
among the Republics. 36 As Marshal Shaposhnikov himself admitted,
“political realities had made it impossible to preserve the unified armed
forces”. 37 The first and more assertive Republic to create its own Army was
the Ukraine, followed by Moldova and Azerbaijan. Uzbekistan soon fol-
lowed them, promulgating in July the Law on Defense, which made the
creation of the Uzbek Armed Forces official, and determined their function
and composition. 38
C) Implementation, Output, Comparison
The implementation of this decision was particularly long and complex,
and in some fields is still going on. The first successive steps, of course,
32 Susan Clark, “The Central Asian States: Defining Security Priorities and Developing
Military Forces”, in Mandelbaum, Ed., Central Asia and the World, Council of Foreign
Relations, New York, 1994., p. 195
33 Valeria Fiorani Piacentini, La Disintegrazione dell’impero sovietico. Problemi di sicurez-
za nazionale e collettiva in Asia Centrale, Rivista Militare, Roma, 1995., p. 98
34 Archive of the Library of Congress, from the web site http://www.loc.gov
35 Barylski, cit.
36 Archive of the Library of Congress, cit.
37 Barylski, cit.
38 Bacarrère-Bécane & Sieca-Kozlowski
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were decided in order to find remedies for the more urgent problems:
reducing the high rate of desertion (by improving the quality of life and the
income of troops), finding Countries ready to provide equipment and
training (in the first years of independence mostly Turkey) and eventually
establishing, from 1994, new Academies and Schools to train officers at
home. These measures were necessary also to implement the line of de-
russification (officially declared by the Minister of Defense of Uzbekistan),
in order to substitute the majority of Russian Officials.
The output, also thanks to some favorable conditions (such as the pres-
ence in the Country of several former Soviet structures) but despite many
limitations (not least the economic problems) was cautiously but undoubt-
edly positive. First of all, there is no doubt that in the early 1990s the only
reasonable decision for a former Soviet Republic (given the environmental
conditions, hostile to any other solution), was to establish its own Army.
The behavior of Karimov in this context can be assessed as positive, avoid-
ing both the radicalism of the Ukraine, and the excessive hesitations of
Kazakhstan, and in accord with the presumable will of Uzbekistan’s pop-
ulation. The Country was probably in the condition to sustain an inde-
pendent Army, and a proof could be the fact that the Armed Forces of
Uzbekistan both managed to defend the Uzbek borders from Islamic
attacks, and were also able to intervene abroad, during the Civil War in
Tajikistan.
The other Central Asian Countries kept different lines from each other,
soon vanifying the dream of a tight cooperation in the field of security.
Turkmenistan’s leadership was the most resolute to refuse the idea of the
CIS unified security, preferring to rely directly on the considerable Russian
troops located on its territory (mainly because of its proximity to Iran)
through bilateral security agreements. On the other hand, Kazakhstan fol-
lowed a completely opposite line: probably pushed by the great number
of ethnic Russians in the Country (more than the Kazakhs, at that time),
President Nazarbaev repeatedly called for unified conventional CIS forces.
When conditions made it necessary to form a national Army, he pursued
a policy aimed at bilateral relations with Russia and tight multilateral
cooperation both among Central Asian and CIS Countries. Kyrgyzstan,
probably the weakest Country in the region, kept a conformist line, sign-
ing all the multilateral CIS agreements and partially relying on Russia for
its security. The situation of Tajikistan will be showed with full details in the
following chapter, mainly devoted to its Civil War.
A) Variables Involved
In the research for this work it was not possible
to find specific statements made by Karimov about
language or alphabet issues: the explanation
could be found again in his will not to foster
interethnic rivalries and, specifically about the alphabet, in the problems
about the decisions’ implementation. Even in his book 39, he never men-
tions the words ‘alphabet’ or ‘Latin’, and barely writes about language in
general terms, as a part of Uzbekistan’s culture and spirituality.
Nevertheless, it is possible to understand the meaning of the important
decisions taken on the subject, both through other speeches made by the
President and his general opinions, and interpreting the strategical aspects
involved in them. First of all, the decision about the passage from the Cyrillic
alphabet to the Latin did not come out of the blue, but was part of a con-
scious strategy aimed at eradicating the legacy of the Soviet past as much
as possible. As Karimov clearly affirms in his book: “after a period of more
than a Century of totalitarian dependence, this process [the restoration of
Uzbekistan’s spiritual and cultural values] initially took quite naturally the
shape of rejection of the recent past.” 40 Added to the more general anti-
Soviet and anti-Russian statements throughout the President’s book, this
phrase can easily help to interpret the decision on alphabet in this perspec-
tive. Moreover, Karimov has always been hostile to Russian hegemony in the
cultural field, from the beginning of his first mandate as President (when the
first law on language was drafted), till recent times (for example in
December 2000 he still blamed the Russian decision to reinstall the old
Soviet anthem “as a symbol of totalitarianism”). 41 Moreover, in the same
paragraph of his book quoted before, Karimov continues: “at the same time,
a thoughtless return to the values […] of the distant past can lead to anoth-
er extreme: the denial of modern life”, with “the further danger of a growth
in an extremist opposition”. 42 Thus, he clearly indicates the pattern of his cul-
tural policy: in addition to the already highlighted Dominant Bilateral, the
other crucial variable involved in this decision was Competing Elites (the
“thoughtless return” in Karimov’s words could easily be represented by the
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39 Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the 21st Century, from the web site
http://www.gov.uz
40 Id., chapter 8
41 AFP: “Uzbek Head Blasts Russian Plan to Reinstate Stalinist Anthem”, 15 December
2000 from the Web Site http://www.uzreport.com
42 Karimov, op. cit., chapter 8
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passage to the Arabic alphabet decided in Tajikistan). More generally, this
decision represents a clear stance against the Slavic world, and also against
the Islamic, and in favor of the West. Consequently, it is appropriate to
include among the Crucial variables also Other Regional.
As Relevant variables, it is also possible to consider Regional and
Bilateral, not only in the same perspective used for Other regional, but also
because specific details of the decision suggest it. As clearly demonstrated
by Olivier Roy, the Latin alphabet introduced in Uzbekistan was con-
sciously created different from that of Turkey and Turkmenistan (whose lan-
guages are near to that spoken in Uzbekistan), even refusing the propos-
al of a common alphabet made by Turkish academicians. A worthwhile
role in the decision was also played by Interest Groups, in a way similar
to that played about the establishment of the Army (see previous para-
graph of this research). However, in this case the variable does not
deserve the degree of Crucial because the nationalist movements,
although weightily influencing the decisions on language, probably did
not take part – in specific – to that on alphabet (on the contrary, most of
them would probably have preferred the Arabic alphabet).
B) Decisional Flow
The language spoken in Uzbekistan and its corresponding alphabet
have been – as well as in the whole region of Central Asia – the object of
frequent manipulations and artificial changes already in the Soviet times,
as part of the so-called ‘nationalities policy’. While the Kazakhs and the
Tajiks already possessed their own literary language, the Uzbeks did not
(and probably always used Persian, written with Arabic characters).
When the Soviet scholars had the task to fix an Uzbek literary language,
they found problems to choose among the many different dialects: at first,
they selected the strongly Iranised dialect spoken in the southern towns; in
1927, contemporarily to a change in alphabet, the literary language was
based on that of northern Uzbekistan; in 1937 it was finally fixed in the
dialect spoken in Tashkent. 43
The alphabet in which this language had to be written underwent, in
all Central Asia, even more changes: starting from the Arabic alphabet
(introduced by the Soviets in the early 1920s as the Central Asian stan-
dard alphabet), in 1926 there was a sudden shift to the Latin (officially as
43 John Glenn, The Soviet Legacy in Central Asia, MacMillan Press, London, 1999
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the result of an all-Union ‘Turcological Congress’, but in reality to mark the
distance from the rest of the Islamic world, outside the USSR). In parallel,
in addition to the above-mentioned change in literary language, many
Arabic words were substituted by ‘international’ (i.e. Russian) ones. In the
late 1930s, however, following the new linguistic theories of Nikolai Marr,
the shift was to Cyrillic, in order to prepare the merge of all Soviet nation-
alities “into a single people” 44 (the real purpose probably was to erode
the pan-Turkic links with Turkey, which had also adopted the Latin alpha-
bet in 1928). 45
This situation remained stable for many decades, in an apparently
quiet acceptation by the culturally colonized peoples. Only in 1989 Uzbek
activists, encouraged by the perestroika, joined other non-Russian nation-
alists in denouncing the linguistic situation (in the Central Asian press of
that period it is possible to find frequent recalls to the Baltic Republics, or
the Caucasus). They highlighted the illogicality of a dominant Russian class
that mostly did not bother to master local languages, so that even in tri-
bunals and schools the non Russian speakers were strongly disadvan-
taged. 46 The situation reached a climax when the authorities, in the sum-
mer of that year, drafted the ‘Bill on languages’. National opinion leaders,
such as Mohammed Solih, lamented that the law, while pretending to fix
Uzbek as official language, in reality granted that status to Russian, that
“might be used optionally as an alternative to Uzbek”. 47 Intellectuals also
criticized the practice of using a Russian name where there was a native
equivalent and the use of ‘alien’ toponyms. Although allegedly insufficient,
the law approved on 21 October 1989 by the Supreme Soviet, requiring
all public officers to master Uzbek, 48 marked the first step toward cultural
independence from Moscow. 
Before true independence was achieved, it was not possible to do much
more, both in Uzbekistan and in the other Central Asian States. After
1991, the situation changed radically, and the new Constitution wanted by
Karimov established without any doubt in Article 4 that “the State lan-
guage of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall be Uzbek” and, although ensur-
ing “a respectful attitude” toward other languages, did not make any par-
44 William Fierman, “The Soviet Transformation of Central Asia”, in William Fierman, Ed.,
Soviet Central Asia. The Failed Transformation, Boulder CO, 1991., p. 30
45 Glenn, op. cit., pp. 81-82
46 Critchlow, op. cit., pp. 104-105
47 Id.
48 Edward Allworth, ed., Central Asia: 130 Years of Russian Dominance, Duke University
Press, 1994., p. 580
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ticular mention of Russian. The policy on languages was not to create
problems for citizenship (although forbidding double citizenship) as hap-
pened for example in the Baltic States, while pretending high standards in
fields such as education. Russian words and toponyms were also gradual-
ly eliminated from the Country and substituted by parts of the reconstruc-
tion of the Uzbek past made by academicians. The new national ban-
knotes were monolingual and visas were written in Uzbek and English
(which is becoming more and more frequently the second language of the
Uzbeks). 49
The point of arrival of this new linguistic policy was the law of 2
September 1993 deciding the shift from the Cyrillic to the Latin Alphabet.
C) Implementation; Output; Comparison
The implementation of the law on alphabet, presently still running, has
been particularly problematic, suggesting that probably the decision was
beyond the means of the Country at that time. Consequently, the initially
foreseen transitional period, between 1995 and 2000, has in fact been
postponed until 2005. These difficulties, however, have also been the effect
of a positive pragmatic approach chosen by the Uzbek authorities: while
Turkmenistan preferred a ‘shock therapy’ prescribing the immediate
change of the alphabet on banknotes and official banners, in Uzbekistan
the priority was given to education and press. A survey conducted on the
Internet on April 2002 by the author of the present research showed that
the Web Sites of the Uzbek Government and of the Uzbek Ministry of
Foreign Affairs still had the Uzbek version of their homepages written in
Cyrillic; on the other hand, the information Web Sites showed a mixed sit-
uation, with some homepages in Latin, and some others in Cyrillic.
The output of the reform, in this still transitional phase, is not clear.
Undoubtedly, when fully implemented, the shift to the Latin alphabet will
make it easier for the Country to comply with the standards of the western
Countries and especially of the European Union, and will improve commu-
nication. However, the success of this decision will probably depend on
choices about other reforms: otherwise, it would probably prove meaning-
less. Scholars such as Olivier Roy point out negatively the choice not to con-
form the alphabet to wider standards (that is, to the Turkish alphabet) and
seem to consider this decision as dictated mostly by ideological reasons.
49 Roy, 1997, op. cit., p. 254
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A comparison with the other Central Asian Countries on this issue
shows an interesting variety of choices, difficult to find in most fields.
While Turkmenistan, almost simultaneously with Uzbekistan, made the
same choice, Tajikistan passed to the Arabic alphabet, and Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan maintained the Cyrillic one. These differences also clear-
ly underline the ideological character of the decisions, probably based
more on the contiguity of the different Countries to different cultures and
spheres of influence, than on their real needs. The differences in language
policy are far lower, with all the new Republics (included Kazakhstan with
its wide Russian minority) establishing the language of the titular national-
ity as the only official. However, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
gave Russian the status of ‘communication language’, preferred in interre-
publican exchanges. 50
A) Variables Involved
Islam Karimov’s education was not that of a
politician or an apparatchik. Both his educational
career (at the polytechnic Institute in Tashkent) and
his early jobs (as Gosplan officer and later head,
and as Minister of Finance) in fact shows him first
of all as an economist. Therefore, when his Country gained independence
in 1991, he was well aware of the enormous economic difficulties that
Uzbekistan had to face, especially in its first years. His recipe in order to
try to cross this critical period (not only as stated in his book, but also as
observed by several analysts), was trying to achieve self-sufficiency in
some strategic fields as soon as possible, and reforming the old command-
and-control Soviet system toward the market (following what he called a
‘gradual path’, in opposition to the shock therapy already negatively
experienced by some former Communist Countries). Moreover, in the first
years of independence, Uzbekistan still depended almost completely on
Russian support and trade. Every innovation, therefore, had to be chosen
at the right time, when the Country would be able to sustain it: this is also
the case of the introduction of the new Uzbek Currency, the Soum, first
introduced temporarily in November 1993, and definitely in July 1994.
The main reason for the decision was represented by the unsustainable
conditions imposed by Russia to the new Republics to remain in the Ruble
50 Roy, 2001, op. cit., p. 78
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zone (Dominant Bilateral). If accepted, they would have weightily limited
the economic freedom of choice of Uzbekistan, and given to Russia a key
to exert influence on its domestic affairs. Until that moment, Uzbekistan
(unlike other Republics), had been very reluctant to take this kind of deci-
sion, because of the awareness that the economy of the Country could not
yet sustain it. However, having to choose between jeopardizing independ-
ence and risking an economic imprudence, Karimov chose the second.
This situation also implied the consideration of Economic Capability fac-
tors: accepting Russia’s preconditions would have meant not only losing
economic independence in decisions, but also giving Russia all the gold
reserves of the Country (particularly huge in Uzbekistan, given its vast
gold resources). Moreover, to be strictly tied to the Russian economy for a
couple of years had already meant going through the negative economic
and inflationist consequences deriving from the ongoing Russian econom-
ic crisis. Notwithstanding, the definitive introduction of the Soum was
made thanks to a generous Turkish loan (Bilateral) conceded by the ‘old
brother’ appositely for this purpose (it was the first period of the Turkish
approach to the new Turkic Republics, when the Anatolian Country tried
to exert a decisive influence of them, by promising aid totaling $ 3 bln.:
soon this perspective would prove unrealistic and unsustainable given
Turkish economic conditions). 51
There is no evidence in the available literature of other variables that
could have had some influence on this decision. First of all, it is unlikely that
Interest Groups in the Country were interested in the subject (if not to ask to
stay in the Rouble zone). Secondarily, although since 1993 international
financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF agreed with the
necessity of currency differentiation for the new Republics, the Uzbek deci-
sion was carried on without any support from or cooperation with them.
B) Decisional Flow
When the CIS was formed, in December 1991, the signatory leaders
committed themselves to promote “coordinated economic reforms”, to
build “economic relations and accountancy based on a single currency,
the Rouble”, to control the quantity of currency circulating, and to coordi-
nate their economic policies. 52 However, when the non-Slavic Republics
51 Gareth Winrow, Turkey in Post- Soviet Central Asia, Royal Institute of International
Affairs, London, 1995
52 Piero Sinatti, “La Riconquista Geoeconomica dell’Impero Russo”, Limes No. 1, 1994
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entered the organization, most of such economic provisions were erased
from the agreement, mainly focusing it on non-economic issues. As a con-
sequence, the reformist Russian leadership carried on its market and lib-
eralization reforms, while most CIS partners called for a delay in the price
liberalization, refused by Moscow. In 1992 the CIS experienced an eco-
nomic crisis, mainly due to the meddling of the new national economic
policies on the former Soviet economic system, once organized as a whole
with strict interrepublican connections. In March 1992 Ukraine, following
the example of the Baltic Countries, was the first CIS Republic to impose a
control on commercial fluxes with Russia and Belarus, minting its own cur-
rency, the Karbovanec. The unilateral price rise decided by Russia further
increased the centrifugal trend toward protectionist economic policies in
the other Republics. In that period, Uzbekistan did not stand out in any
way against the other CIS Countries, while Turkmenistan pursued a much
more aggressive economic policy, oriented toward the new southern and
eastern markets.
During 1992, several Central Asian summits and the adhesion of the
new Republics to the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO),
revealed the embryo of a common regional economic policy. Meanwhile,
Russia was dissatisfied about the exploitation of the low price of raw mate-
rials within the CIS, made by some CIS members which sold their products
at market prices to non-CIS Countries. Therefore, Moscow considerably
reduced its export toward the CIS members.
In the monetary field, however, the Russian Central Bank was still the
only Issue Bank for the whole Rouble zone; for the whole 1992 and part
of 1993 it kept on issuing both Nalicnye (cash) Rubles – although with
growing restrictions –, and Beznalicnye (non cash) Rubles. These latter,
also named ‘technical credits’ were mostly transferred to the other
Republics, whose firms used them to pay imports from Russia: this was one
of the main reasons for the uncontrolled inflationist spiral of that period. A
Russian economic analyst later estimated Russia’s financial aid to
Uzbekistan as representing 52.8% in its GDP (a share only a little lower
was estimated for Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan). This policy was mainly
pursued by the Russian leadership in order to try to perpetuate its hege-
mony on the ‘near abroad’.
However, during 1993, Russian reformists definitely realized that this
system could not work, and in September the Russian Central Bank
provocatively (and, reportedly, against the will of President Yeltsin),
announced the withdrawal of all the Rubles issued between 1962 and
1992. Contextually, a New Type Rouble Area was proposed. On 7
September, Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan agreed on the creation of the New Area: the provisions also
included a new degree of economic coordination among the Republics.
However, several Russian economists severely criticized the agreement,
being afraid that the partner Countries, once they had obtained the new
Rubles from Moscow, could mint their own currencies. Russia therefore
added new conditions (such as the cession to Russia of an equivalent part
of the national gold reserves, and the payment of interest in US Dollars)
that both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan found unacceptable. Uzbekistan,
along with Kazakhstan, Armenia and Moldova, announced the creation of
a national currency (named Soum) and menaced to close the commercial
frontiers with Russia. 53
The new Uzbek currency was temporarily introduced in November
1993 as ‘Soum Coupon’, substituting the Rouble. Despite an inflation of 5-
600% in two months compared with the Rouble, on 1st January 1994, the
Soum Coupon was declared Uzbekistan’s only legal currency. On 1st July
1994, drawing the necessary resources fron a Turkish loan, Uzbekistan
substituted the Soum Coupon with the proper Soum. 54
C) Implementation; Output; Comparison
The implementation of the decision on the new currency was recognized
as problematic by all observers, especially because the IMF (allegedly
because of the “scarce reformist inclination of Tashkent”), denied the logis-
tical and financial support given to several other Republics. 55 At least until
1996, when some reforms were sketched, the control over the quantity of
currency circulating in the Country was very limited, producing a high rate
of inflation and a double exchange rate (official / black market). 56 In
1996-97 the first real reforms were drafted, also drawing the IMF support,
which however was soon withdrawn, in lack of real implementation of the
reforms. In the following years, Uzbekistan repeatedly announced the
introduction of a full convertibility for the Soum, but at the end of 2001 such
a reform had not yet been realized.
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54 Fiorani Piacentini, 1995, op. cit., pp. 333-334
55 Id.
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The output of the decision, in absolute terms, can but be assessed as
negative for the Country’s economy. However, the introduction of a
national currency was probably a necessary and inevitable decision on
the path to building a real nation-state.
This fact is also showed by the quasi-unanimity in the behavior of the
other former Soviet Republics, of which only Belarus (the Republic with
more political connections with Russia, some years later signing a ‘Pact of
Union’ with it), accepted all the conditions imposed by Moscow. Among
the Central Asian Republics, only Tajikistan – wasted at that time by the
civil war – was unable to issue a national currency, preferring to maintain
the old Rouble. On the other hand, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan were the
readiest to take their own path: the latter even issuing its own national cur-
rency (also named Soum) in Spring 1993. Kazakhstan kept a conciliatory
position not dissimilar from Uzbekistan’s, and almost in the same period
issued the Tenge. 57
57 Sinatti, cit.
CHAPTER 3
In Search of Regional Hegemony?
The foreign policy of independent Uzbekistan
within the borders of Central Asia always showed
a particularly high profile: while, in wider arenas,
the Country can at most follow a simple line (gain-
ing support and investments from the developed Countries and resisting
Russian and Islamic pressures), in the region it plays other different roles
in a complex network of interrelations.
First of all, although never openly admitted by President Karimov, it
is possible to find in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy hegemonic ambitions
that are nearly universally recognized by the academic community. As
Bohr points out, in particular, such feelings are rooted in the Soviet past,
when Moscow allegedly recognized to Uzbekistan a role in the Central
Asian context not dissimilar from that played by Russia in the whole
Soviet Union. 58 After independence, this situation has commuted into a
sort of competition between Uzbekistan and Russia for hegemony in the
region with the two regional powers sometimes cooperating, and other
times competing for the same targets. Uzbekistan was often forced to
accept Russian superiority, and even to call for help to Moscow; on the
other hand, in some situations Karimov was able to exploit geographi-
cal proximity and better availability of information to get what he want-
ed.
With the other Countries of the region, as already seen, the relations
are diversified and sometimes ambiguous. While Turkmenistan (and in
particular its dictator Niyazov) is particularly cold toward the powerful
neighbor, and always relied on Russia for its defense, Kazakhstan –
willing to counterbalance the Russian weight in its domestic affairs but
also afraid of Uzbekistan’s power – alternates moments of closeness to
others of confrontation; this is more or less the same situation as in
Kyrgyzstan, otherwise weaker and more subject to the Uzbek intimida-
tion.
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The real theater for Uzbekistan’s attempts for a more assertive region-
al policy in the 1990s was undoubtedly Tajikistan. This happened not only
in its quality as the weakest Country in Central Asia, but also because of
peculiar ties developed between the two Republics during the Soviet rule,
when Uzbek meddling in Tajikistan’s domestic affairs was common prac-
tice.
The three decisions chosen for this section of the research pertain to
complex interrelations between Uzbekistan and the other Countries of
Central Asia, examined in different periods of time. The first, included in
the Military-Security area, will deal with the Uzbek decision to get involved
in the Tajik Civil War in 1992. The following one, classified instead as
Political-Diplomatic, will investigate the someway inexplicable shift in
Karimov’s stance, when he recognized the democratic opposition in the
Country and called for a reconciliation with the UN help. The third (again
Political-Diplomatic) will treat the more recent Uzbek decision to unilater-
ally marking the borders with the neighbors, in a period of problematic
interregional relations both in the economic and in the security fields.
A) Variables Involved
Karimov apparently never released public
statements showing his position on Uzbekistan’s
intervention in Tajikistan’s Civil War in support of
the Northern/Communist faction. The reason was
probably that the deployment of Uzbek troops in
the neighboring Country was officially presented as a participation in the
CIS Peacekeeping Force, without any partisan role. The book later written
by Karimov does not help more, since it follows the official line adopted
from 1995: in the work is simply cited the “hotbed of crisis” in Tajikistan
(along with that in Afghanistan), as a threat to regional (and Uzbekistan’s)
security, blaming the negative consequences of war and generally speak-
ing from a completely uninterested and uninvolved perspective. Something
can be inferred from more general statements: first of all, Tajikistan is the
Central Asian Republic most mentioned in the book (except Uzbekistan);
three times Karimov deals, in different parts of the book, with the problem
of the Uzbek Diaspora, particularly significant in Tajikistan, and presents
the cultures of the two nations as very close to each other. 59 This attitude
59 Karimov, op. cit., chapter 1
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as an ‘elder brother’ more evidently appears in some of Karimov’s speech-
es released during the terrorism emergency, in the late 1990s and in the
early 2000s. In this context, the words pronounced by Karimov at the
Uzbek Parliament in Summer 2000, after the IMU incursions in Uzbekistan
from the Tajik territory, were: “Today security issues are indivisible for all
of us […] In this context, the security of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and other
neighboring Countries is also our security, the security of all people in the
region. We have to well understand this […] Only through the rapid and
operative coordination of our cooperative action we will be able to strike
back any aggression […] We must not allow these curse[d] people to use
the Tajik territory to bring about their filthy intentions”. 60 In April 1999,
during a speech reported by the newspaper Vremia and quoted by Rumer,
he more openly stated: “Look at the Map and at our border with
Leninabad Oblast of Tajikistan, and you will see a tongue that has been
thrust out into our territory”. 61
The evident characteristics of these speeches are the security concerns
of the President, which make the Variable Military Capability undoubted-
ly crucial, and the identification of Uzbekistan’s security with Central
Asia’s, added to the Country’s will to control the northern part of Tajikistan
and its strategical and natural resources (Regional and Economic
Capability). Another primary reason for the decision – not mentioned by
the President in this specific context but widely recognized by scholars – 62
is the fear of Islamic radicalism, that is, of Competing Elites spreading from
Tajikistan to his Country. An important factor in Karimov’s consideration of
this variable was also probably the role played in Tajikistan’s affairs by the
Republic’s Qadi (religious leader), Akbar Turajonzoda, in a period when
important personalities of the Uzbek Muftiyyat (Spiritual Directorship)
were also deeply involved in Uzbekistan’s public life.
Strictly connected to Competing Elites, but not as crucial for the decision,
was probably the influence of Uzbekistan’s Political System. In the literature
it is even possible to find an interpretation of the decision as a means used
60 “Address by H. E. Mr. Islam Karimov, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, in the 3rd
session of Oliy Majlis of 2nd Convocation”, 2000, from the Web Site http://www.mfa.uz
61 Boris Rumer, Central Asia and the New Global Economy, Sharpe, London/Armonk NY,
2000, p. 16
62 Giampaolo Capisani, The Handbook of Central Asia, Tauris, London/New York, 2000.,
p. 87; John Anderson, The International Politics of Central Asia, Manchester University Press,
Manchester/New York, 1997, p. 178; Lena Jonson, “Russian Policy and Tajikistan”, Central
Asia No. 2, 1997, from the Web Site http://www.ca-c.org; Stuart Horsman, “Uzbekistan’s
Involvement in the Tajik Civil War 1992-97: Domestic Considerations”, Central Asian Survey,
Mar. 1999
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by Karimov to crush domestic opposition and affirm his power completely,
as a part of a “conceptualization of Uzbekness”. 63 Finally, the Uzbek
Diaspora in Tajikistan as an Interest Group is openly cited by Karimov in
his book (as seen above), although scholars 64 think that he never played
this card seriously, afraid of regional destabilization. This opinion is prob-
ably proved by the deportation to Tajikistan of the ethnic Uzbek refugees in
the Country simply as a retaliation in the ‘trade war’ of 2000.
B) Decisional Flow
The Uzbek presence in Tajikistan’s domestic affairs began as of the first
Soviet delimitation of the Central Asian boundaries, when the Persian-
speaking populations were mainly included in the Uzbek SSR as a simple
Autonomous Republic. Only in 1929 the Russians, willing to weaken the
new Republics further, created the Tajik SSR in its own right, but left the
main Tajik cities, Bukhara and Samarkand, in the Uzbek SSR. The borders
between the two Republics, moreover, made it necessary to cross the
Uzbek border to pass form Northern to Southern Tajikistan. The reciprocal
minorities were also considerable, especially the Uzbeks of Tajikistan, in
1989 still accounting for 24% of the total population. This community was
very strong in the Hissar region (45%), and Kurgan Tiube (32%), though
spreading all over the Country. The most significant presence, although not
numerically (31%) was that in the region of Leninabad (now Khojand),
which hosted for decades the Country’s hegemonic faction. 65 This position
of preeminence was allowed by Russia’s decision to assign a particular
social niche to the people of each one of the regions of the Republic, also
subject to compulsive displacements of ethnic groups which lasted until the
1970s. In particular, the people from Leninabad always maintained privi-
leged economic relations with Uzbekistan, thus impeding the formation of
a national integrated economy in the Republic. 66
Although perestroika was weaker in Tajikistan than in other parts of the
USSR, in February 1990 the economic and cultural disproportion between
the different regions led to a grass-roots protest in its Capital Dushanbe.
63 Horsman, cit.
64 Horsman, cit. ; Jonson, cit.
65 Barnett H. Rubin, “Tajikistan: from Soviet Republic to Russian- Uzbek Protectorate”, in
Mandelbaum, op. cit., pp. 210-211
66 Gretsky, Sergei, “Civil War in Tajikistan: Causes, Developments and Prospects for
Peace”, in Roald Sagdeev and Susan Eisenhower, eds., Central Asia: Conflict, Resolution,
and Change., from the Web Site http://www.cpss.org
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The protest front, calling for democratization and equilibrium in regional
representation, was formed by the Rastokhez Popular Movement (nation-
alistic), the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, and the Tajik branch of the
Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP). Although associated with more specifical-
ly regionalist groups, all these movements were mainly rooted in the
regions excluded from the power, especially in the poor south of the
Country. However, the leading bloc (at first supported also by the interna-
tional press) always preferred to present the struggle as an ideological
confrontation, although in reality the reforms asked by the opposition
threatened to undermine the essence of Leninabad’s power.
Meanwhile, the developments of the Soviet situation forced the
Republic to declare its independence in September 1991; two months
later, the Communist Party leader, Nabiev, was elected president of the
Republic. The opposition, gathered around a single candidate, gained
30% of the votes, and continued to stage protests, which erupted violently
in March 1992, when Nabiev arrested the pro-opposition Major of
Dushanbe on corruption charges. The protests escalated after the fall of
Najibullah’s government in neighboring Afghanistan: violent clashes on 6
and 7 May claimed several victims. On 11 May Nabiev was forced to
agree to a coalition government with the opposition. 67 Although the doc-
umented Uzbek intervention dates December 1992, some commentators 68
point out a primary role played by Karimov in this circumstance to favor
the alliance of Leninabad with the Kulobi faction (traditionally forming the
bulk of the Tajik Army and security apparatus). However, the opposition
forces, supported by some Islamic Countries and especially by the Afghan
Mujaheddin (although Karimov managed to impede that attacks were
staged from the territories controlled by the Uzbek Warlord Dostum), con-
quered significant portions of the Tajik territory. When the war came to
Dushanbe, Nabiev was forced to sign a letter of resignation on September
7, and Iskandarov, the ethnic Pamiri Chairman of the Supreme Soviet,
became acting president of an ‘Opposition Government’. 69
In the same period, Karimov decided that the time had come to
upgrade Uzbekistan’s involvement in Tajikistan. He had declared several
times that he would consider the establishment of an Islamic regime in
Dushanbe a casus belli. 70 On September 4, together with the Russian and
67 Rubin, cit., p. 213
68 Bohr, op. cit., p. 52; Gretski, cit.
69 Rubin, cit., p. 214
70 Capisani, op. cit., p. 169
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Central Asian leaders, he had issued a warning that the conflict endan-
gered the security of the whole region. Mainly Uzbek fighters from Hissar
and Kurgan Tiube, as well as Kulobis, were armed and trained in
Uzbekistan. Troops from Uzbekistan were also prepared for a future offen-
sive. Karimov also managed to convince Russia of the real threat of Islamic
radicalism. Moscow then decided to employ the 201st Motorized Rifle
Division, already in Tajikistan, together with Russian Border Guards, who
had remained neutral until that moment. On December 6, forces backed
by the Uzbek aircraft attacked the Capital, and Rakhmonov was able to
take up his post in Dushanbe 8 days later. 71 On 9 December the Uzbek
Parliament officially approved the deployment of Uzbek troops within the
CIS forces (although these were actually formed only in August 1993). 72
C) Implementation; Output; Comparison
The implementation of this decision mainly consisted in the inclusion of
an Uzbek battalion within the CIS forces, along with the Russian troops,
but also in many unofficial interventions, especially through Uzbekistan’s
support to Tajikistan’s ethnic Uzbek militias. It might be possible to say that
the decision was implemented independently from its formalization: in this
perspective, the official decision could be considered no more than the
recognition of a de facto situation.
The output of the decision was positive without any doubt, whatever the
opinion of the observers on the morality of Karimov’s purposes. The
Northern/Communist forces backed by Russia and Uzbekistan managed
in fact to get back the whole Tajik territory, although they were not able to
impede further incursions from Afghanistan. Uzbekistan consequently
regained control over Tajikistan’s domestic affairs through the friendly
Leninabad faction, with also positive economic consequences for the
Tashkent. Karimov moreover gained complete control over Uzbekistan’s
political system and civil society, both crushing the Islamic opposition, and
using the situation in Tajikistan as a means to tighten domestic security.
The other Central Asian Countries kept a much lower profile than
Uzbekistan: while Kazakhstan participated in the CIS forces with a mini-
mum number of troops, Kyrgyzstan’s parliament (at that time still relative-
ly independent from the executive power) refused authorization to the
71 Rubin, cit., p. 215
72 Capisani, op. cit., p. 169
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deployment, and Turkmenistan never considered the subject. 73 The only
other regional power significantly involved were the Afghan Mujaheddin
of Commander Massud, strong supporters of the Islamic part of the oppo-
sition.
A) Variables Involved
Karimov’s moves of early 1995 were found
surprising by scholars and, generally, by those
who know his aversion to politicized Islam.
However, not less surprisingly, the same scholars
explained these events using nearly the same reasons previously adopted
to motivate the Uzbek involvement in the war, both because the interna-
tional situation had changed, and because Karimov had reached his
alleged objectives. This time, the President’s book, Uzbekistan on the
threshold of the Twenty-First Century proves helpful: since the essay was
written in the mid-1990s, it is reasonable to presume that it reflects the
author’s opinion (or at least his official stance) at that time.
In the already mentioned first chapter of his book Karimov names
Tajikistan essentially to point out the negative effects of the war, interest-
ingly linking the Tajik and the Afghan situation. He writes about his con-
cerns: refugees, arms and drugs smuggling, interethnic confrontation,
danger in changing the existing borders. In his words it is evident that
what once had been a simple struggle for power in an Uzbek quasi-pro-
tectorate, had become three years later, also in the light of the rise of the
Taliban in Afghanistan, a danger for regional security much greater than
Tajikistan’s opposition forces. The President in fact writes: “The destructive
impact of war on society and on the State is not only apparent in economic
disaster […] but also in other spheres that are of primary importance for
a nation’s future […] the dissemination of hatred among co-citizens, […]
the flow of refugees […], the criminalization of society, the turning of war
into the sole source of earnings”. Later, he adds that “the threat to the secu-
rity of Uzbekistan is not hypothetical, its existence is obvious”, underlining
his “huge efforts […] to prevent the spilling over of the conflicts and the
adverse developments on to our soil”. 74 He evidently connects his new
position on regional conflicts to the same variables that probably had
73 Rubin, pp. 214-215
74 Karimov, op. cit., chapter 1
3. SUPPORTING THE
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pushed him to intervene in the Civil War in 1993. The main concern is still
security (that is, Military Capability), especially in the context of the
Central Asian subordinate system (Regional). He adds, again, Economic
Capability reasons: years of struggle in a neighboring territory strictly
interconnected with Uzbekistan had worsened the already precarious eco-
nomic situation of the Republic, that had also progressively lost its control
over Northern Tajikistan resources. Karimov also shows to be afraid of a
possible spill over of the religious character of the conflicts in Uzbekistan’s
society (Competing Elites). 75 Scholars just add what Karimov could not
publicly admit: the progressive marginalization of the Khojandi (former
Leninabadi) faction (allied of Tashkent) in Tajikistan’s struggle for power,
which now impeded Uzbekistan to exercise a decisive influence on Tajik
domestic affairs, and therefore made Uzbekistan’s military involvement in
the Country no longer reasonable. 76 However, such a consideration does
not change the variables involved, although adding new meanings to the
decision.
Among the Relevant Variables, this time, it is advisable to include the
Global System, with a primary role played by international organizations
such as the United Nations and the OSCE in finding a solution for the con-
flict. 77 Of course, showing a peaceful attitude in that situation was also a
means to gain international recognition for Uzbekistan. There are proofs
that Karimov also called for the help of the UNHCR about the Refugees’
problem. 78 An important role in the situation was also performed by the
Uzbek minority in northern Tajikistan, more and more dissatisfied about
the loss of political and economic power (in May 1994 the Hissari local
community even blocked the vital road connecting the two Countries 79):
such a protest could not be neglected by the leader (Interest Groups).
Finally, the shift in Karimov’s position on the war probably aimed to mark
some distance from Russia’s position and to limit Moscow’s influence in the
region (Dominant Bilateral). A probable proof of this was his criticism of
Russia’s unconditional support to Tajikistan’s regime, considered as “a
main reason for the deteriorating relations between Russia and
Uzbekistan”. 80
75 Id.
76 Bohr, op. cit., p. 52
77 Olivier Roy, “The Role of the OCSE in the Peace process of Tajikistan”, in Sagdeev and
Eisenhower, eds., op. cit.
78 Capisani, op. cit., p. 87
79 Capisani, op. cit., p. 171
80 Jonson, cit.
B) Decisional Flow
By December 1992, “what many have called the bloodiest Battle in the
former Soviet Union since World War II had claimed 50,000 lives and dis-
placed 500,000” 81 (1/10 of the Country’s population); however, the
Country was entirely reconquered and the opposition fled to exile abroad,
especially in Afghanistan, from where it continued to engage battle with the
CIS troops. A border attack on July 1993 had a deep impact also on
Russian public opinion and not only determined a Moscow’s greater
involvement, but also probably convinced the Russians of the necessity to
find a solution to the conflict. Pushed also by international pressures, the
opposing parts agreed to meet for negotiations in a far from propitious cli-
mate. The main stake was that the winner, the Khojandi-Kulobi faction (still
sponsored also by Tashkent), had no interest in sharing its power with the
opposition. However, after some rounds of talks, the two parts agreed on a
cease-fire in September 1994, followed by Presidential and Parliamentary
elections in which the opposition was partly allowed to participate. For the
presidential post the Kulobi Rakhmonov defeated the Uzbek-sponsored
Abdullajonov, of the Khojand clan; moreover, contextually with the election
of the new Parliament, the Kulobis started to drive Khojandis from their
positions in both central and local government: as a consequence, the
Uzbeks of Tajikistan “came to perceive themselves as the targets of Kulobi
discrimination”. 82 Dissatisfaction spread also among the Russian minority
in the Country and in Kazakhstan, as well as in Uzbekistan.
Karimov, dissatisfied with the developments of the situation and wary
of the new regional set up, suddenly became a critic of the Dushanbe
regime. The first sign of this shift was evident at the February 1995 CIS
summit in Almaty, where he launched a bitter attack on President
Rakhmonov. The fact that not only words had changed was demonstrated
by the meeting of Karimov with the previously execrated Qadi
Turajonzoda (in the meanwhile named leader of the United Tajik
Opposition, UTO) in the following April in Tashkent.
C) Implementation; Output; Comparison
This decision, taking the international community by surprise, never
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81 Kim Kaynard, “Tajikistan: Will We Heed the Warning?”, Central Asia Monitor, No. 5,
1993, from the Web Site http://www.chalidze.com
82 Bohr, op. cit., p. 52
received a formal implementation. However, the events of spring 1995
marked the beginning of a new peaceful official course of Uzbekistan’s
international relations, with the Republic’s leader repeatedly calling for
peace and even (as seen above) criticizing Russia for its pro-Dushanbe
stance. The new position was, however, secretly implemented by a series
of measures aiming to weaken the Tajik regime and trying to promote an
alliance between opposition forces and the Khojandi clan against the
Kulobis. Undoubtedly Tashkent started to support all the groups fighting
against the regime: in the following months, the relations between the two
neighbors dramatically deteriorated, and Uzbekistan was accused by
Rakhmonov of supporting Uzbek mercenaries now fighting with the oppo-
sition, 83 and even of complicity in the assassination attempt against
Rakhmonov of April 1997 during a visit in Khojand. 84 Tashkent was also
allegedly implicated in several attempts of armed rebellion in the north of
the Country, successfully countered by the Russian troops. The rebels’
leader, the ethnic Uzbek Commander Khudoberdiyev, was said to have
invaded from camps located inside Uzbekistan. Although Tashkent offi-
cially denied any involvement, a Deputy of the Commander testified that
the rebels had received help from the Uzbek Army, though not necessari-
ly with the knowledge of Uzbekistan’s top leadership. 85
The output of this decision was doubtful, since Uzbekistan managed
neither to get back the influence of the old times in Tajikistan’s domestic
affairs, nor to seriously challenge Russia’s influence on the Country. On the
other hand, the 1995 decision was probably wise, in a context that had
become very costly to Uzbekistan without providing an adequate reward
anymore.
As already seen in the previous decision, two of the Central Asian
Republics were never really involved in the War: a comparison with
them is therefore impossible. About Kazakhstan, in the same period of
the Uzbek shift his domestic public opinion growingly felt “that the
Country should withdraw its peace-keepers from the southern borders of
Tajikistan where Kazakh troops were dying for a cause that was not their
own”. 86 President Nazarbaev therefore joined Karimov in his calls for
peace.
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83 Anderson, op. cit., p. 183
84 Bohr, op. cit., p. 52
85 Bohr, op. cit., p. 54
86 Anderson, op. cit., p. 182
A) Variables Involved
From the moment of independence to the late
1990s, the Central Asian borders remained high-
ly permeable: most of all, this situation reflected
the nature of boundaries (mostly drawn by Stalin
in the 1920s) that, especially in the Ferghana Valley, had no connection
with the real situation (both geographically and demographically). While
crossing borders, there was often no sign of change in the human and
physical environment, and travelers often passed from one Country to
another without finding a checkpoint. 87
When in 1999 the Uzbek Army started to unilaterally mark the borders
of the Country, no formal decision was allegedly communicated both to the
press and to the neighboring Countries involved (Tajikistan was officially
informed that Uzbekistan had laid land mines on its borders only in May
2001). 88 However, the theme of the inviolability of borders had always
been common in Karimov’s speeches, and was already mentioned in
Article 3 of the 1992 Constitution, and in several parts of the president’s
book. In Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century, in fact,
the word ‘border(s)’ appears 26 times, and mostly in three well-defined
contexts: to warn about the danger in conflicts raging just at the borders
of the Country (with the risk of spillover); to highlight the risk involved in
any attempt to change the existing State boundaries; to affirm the need to
sign security agreements that could strengthen the borders and their invi-
olability. 89 Without any doubt, in Karimov’s Image of Uzbekistan’s inter-
national relations, borders are (quite naturally) connected with security
(Military Capability). In the particular context of 1999-2000, however, this
concern probably was strictly connected to the danger of Islamic militants’
penetration inside the borders of the Country (Competing Elites). Already
on 3 February 1999 Karimov affirmed, in a press interview about this sub-
ject, that the group of Hizb-ut Tahrir intended “to eliminate all administra-
tive boundaries between Islamic Countries”, warning the Government not
to “allow such forces to act on Uzbek territory”. 90
A new security doctrine was probably already decided at that time, but
the turning point was represented by the bombing attacks shortly after-
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87 Interview by the author of this research to professor Guido Franzinetti
88 BBC News, 7 May 2001, from the Web Site http://www.bbc.co.uk
89 Karimov, op. cit.
90 RFERL Newsline, 4 February 1999, from the Web Site http://www.rferl.org
4. MARKING 
THE BORDERS
(AUGUST 1999 – PD)
wards, and by the IMU 91 incursions of that summer. In a television speech
immediately after the attack he defined the Islamic radicals as sure culprits
and underlined the necessity to preserve the security of the Country.92 On
May 7, Karimov chaired a session of the National Security Council, affirm-
ing the necessity “to prevent terrorist and subversive groups from illegally
entering Uzbekistan”. 93 The following incursions were decisive mostly in
determining the exact object of such new measures: Afghanistan and
Tajikistan, where the terrorist camps were located, with the complicity of
the local authorities 94 (Regional). The strengthening of border measures
and visa requirements, however, cannot completely be explained without
linking it also to the ‘trade war’ going on in Central Asia in the same peri-
od (Economic Capability). In fact, the deteriorated economic situation of
the late 1990s led the Countries of the region to start imposing severe
restrictions and custom duties on imports, and to limit import of goods
from the neighbors, soon leading to a succession of mutual retaliations
also involving gas, transportation and water resources sectors. This situa-
tion of harsh confrontation among the Republics undoubtedly contributed
to the relevance of the borders issue.
The only other relevant variable involved in the decision was Dominant
Bilateral. As already seen in the previous decision, in fact, Karimov was
sharply critical about Russia’s behavior when Uzbekistan called for its help
against the Taliban conquering the north of Afghanistan on the Uzbek bor-
der. This may have determined Karimov’s decision to further develop
Uzbekistan’s own capability to defend its borders (also with a different
international alignment, obtained entering the GUAM – Georgia, Ukraine,
Azerbaijan, Moldova – and increasing cooperation with NATO).
B) Decisional Flow
The borders issue, at least according to the existing literature, was never
formalized in a single decision; the fragmentary development of the situa-
tion even suggests that it was no more than a cluster of policies and deci-
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91 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, an extremist Islamic organization affiliated to al
Quaeda, and aiming at the creation of an Islamic caliphate in Central Asia through guerril-
la activities
92 “Uzbek President Speaks on Bomb Attacks”, February 1999, from the Web Site
http://www.euronet.nl
93 RFERL Newsline, 7 May 1999, from the Web Site http://www.rferl.org
94 Uzbekistan Daily Digest, 1st September 2000, from the Web Site
http://www.eurasianet.org
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sions implemented since the beginning of 1999. Such policies and deci-
sions were probably at first the output of a more assertive foreign policy in
the region decided by president Karimov in the late 1990s (also reflected,
in a wider arena, by the withdrawal from the CIS Collective Security Treaty
and the adhesion to GUAM). However, after the events of February and
August 1999 the President probably came to the decision that a definite
demarcation of Uzbekistan’s borders could no longer be postponed.
Karimov’s first intention to strengthen national borders was showed by
a presidential Decree creating new units of border guards, signed on 14
January 1999. 95 However, immediately after the assassination attempt to
Karimov of February 16 (and other similar events in Kazakhstan in the fol-
lowing days), the security measures along the Kazakh and the Kyrgyz bor-
ders were tightened, and, on the 1st of March, Karimov introduced new
regulations on residency and visas, particularly requiring a visa for citi-
zens of CIS Countries visiting Uzbekistan for more than three days. 96 In
the meantime the relations between Central Asian neighbors had been
worsened by the first events in what Boris Rumer called a ‘trade war’.
Kazakhstan, according to the Russian scholar, was the first to act, estab-
lishing in February limits to (and duties on) imports from Russia,
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. In March, Uzbekistan asked Kyrgyzstan to
pay its debts for natural gas supplies. 97 During the Parliamentary debate
developed in Kyrgyzstan after this measure, some Deputies raised for the
first time the border issue, complaining that Uzbekistan had built in the
previous years no less than 27 new outposts on the borders between the
two Countries, and that Uzbekistan had annexed significant chunks of the
Kyrgyz territory. 98 On 19 March, a new decree fixed the deadline for all
former Soviet citizens in Uzbekistan to change their old Passports into new
Uzbek ones. Some days later, the Country, as well as Kyrgyzstan,
increased custom duties, and the Uzbek Defense Minister openly discussed
for the first time the possibility of entering the GUAM (the announcement
of the accession was officially given by Georgia’s President Shevarnadze
on 19 April). 99
Between April and May of the same year the trade war also sharpened,
95 RFERL Newsline, 14 January 1999, from the Web Site http://www.rferl.org
96 RFERL Newsline, 3 March 1999, from the Web Site http://www.rferl.org
97 Rumer, 2000, op. cit., pp. 11-13
98 RFERL Newsline, 12 March 1999, from the Web Site http://www.rferl.org
99 RFERL Newsline, 19 March 1999, 30 March 1999, 19 April 1999, from the Web Site
http://www.rferl.org
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with mutual blockages involving not only gas, but also train transportation,
coal delivery, and water supplies: reports from those days are full of news
about the imposition or the end of new punitive measures, often appearing
contradictory with each other. 100 In march 27-28, high-level meetings
between Uzbek and Kazakh officers not only dealt with economy but also
(maybe for the first time) with the borders issue: Kazakhstan’s Foreign
Minister Qasymzhomart Toqaev said after that occasion that the border
demarcation issue was “one of the most complicated questions in relations
between Astana and Tashkent”. 101 Also with Tajikistan, despite the signing
of an anti-terrorist agreement, the series of reciprocal accusations of host-
ing members of the respective armed oppositions continued. 102 On 7 July,
Karimov chaired a session of the National Security Council devoted to the
implementation of government decisions aimed at improving security and
reorganizing the armed forces and border troops. Particular attention was
paid to improving cooperation between the army and the Interior Ministry
forces, to preventing terrorist and subversive groups from illegally entering
Uzbekistan, and to creating “mobile and well-equipped units capable of
safeguarding peace and calm”. 103
In the following August these provisions proved someway prophetic,
when the IMU incursions provoked not only fear in the Central Asian
Countries but also new tensions among them. In this situation, Uzbek raids
in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to strike the terrorists involved also civilian
casualties in the two Countries. 104
After the end of the so-called Batken incident (when some western
tourists had been kidnapped by the guerrillas), news reported that
Uzbekistan was unilaterally demarcating its borders in the Ferghana
Valley. 105
C) Implementation; Output; Comparison
The implementation of the August 1999 (presumed) decision to mark
Uzbekistan’s borders – clearly enough to discourage further incursions
100 Rumer, 2000, op. cit.; RFERL Newsline
101 RFERL Newsline, 28 May 1999, from the Web Site http://www.rferl.org
102 RFERL Newsline, April–May 1999, from the Web Site http://www.rferl.org
103 Interfax and Itar-Tass, quoted by RFERL Newsline, 7 July 1999, from the Web Site
http://www.rferl.org
104 BBC News, 18 August 1999, from the Web Site http://www.bbc.co.uk
105 Nick Megoran, “The Borders of Eternal Friendship: Kyrgyz-Uzbek Relations in 1999”,
December 1999-January 2000, from the Web Site http://www.eurasianet.org
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and infiltration of undesired elements – was not easy. First of all, because
of the significant resources required not only to demarcate, but also to
patrol and to adequately defend national frontiers. Moreover, Central
Asian boundaries were artificially drawn by somebody who presumably
did not know the reality of the territory and its people, or, on the contrary,
deliberately tried to create difficulties for the new nationalities to gather. In
the Ferghana valley, particularly, the same populations live on both sides
of often intricate borders, and both industrial activities and water reser-
voirs overlap national borders. None of the commissions created in Soviet
times to deal with the problem ever managed to solve it. When Uzbekistan
began to implement his new policy, observers reported that the Uzbek
Army had erected columns of concrete connected by barbed wire, cutting
in two communities traditionally living together. People on both sides of the
borders were worried about the perspective of needing a visa to meet their
former neighbors (with especially serious economic damage, both at citi-
zens’ and at national level). 106 In the following months, similar actions,
probably reflecting the same kind of policy, were reported also on the bor-
ders with Kazakhstan. 107 Even more serious measures were taken against
Tajikistan, where training camps of the IMU were located; in this case,
Uzbekistan eventually admitted to have put mines along the common bor-
der (probably a not much different policy was pursued against
Afghanistan). 108
The output of these policies was ambivalent: on the one hand, they rep-
resented a natural step in building a national State, not unlike forming a
national Army or currency: it is unthinkable that an autonomous statal enti-
ty was not able to defend (or even to define) its borders. However, the way
and the time the decisions were taken and implemented by Uzbekistan cre-
ated serious problems and tensions in the region, with negative conse-
quences also for the projected economic integration. Despite several
attempts to settle the disputes followed, a new equilibrium was achieved
only during the fall 2001, (when US-sponsored negotiations led, for exam-
ple, to an agreement between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, fixing defi-
nitely 96% of the common borders). 109
106 Id.
107 “Border Trouble”, The Economist, 19 February 2000, from the Web Site
http://www.economist.com
108 BBC News
109 Alima Bissenova, “Kazakhstani-Uzbek Border Agreement Sets Stage for Broader
Central Asian Cooperation”, Eurasia Insight, 19 December 2001, from the Web Site
http://www.eurasianet.org
W
PAP
ER
S
ORKING
DIPARTIMENTO DI STUDI POLITICI – UNIVERSITÀ DI TORINO
46
Tashkent’s decision, apparently, was not followed by similar stances
taken by other Countries in the region (too weak or too vast to successful-
ly implement this kind of policy). Scholars report instead a conciliatory
behavior kept by the Kyrgyz and Kazakh authorities, also at the highest
levels, which impeded the situation to degenerate. 110 These Countries
probably continued to rely on CIS (that is, Russian) forces to ensure the
security of their national borders.
110 Megoran, cit.; “Border Trouble”, cit.
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CHAPTER 4
Extra – Regional Strategies
The extra-regional strategies probably are the
most ambiguous, (but also the most challenging
for the researcher) part of Uzbekistan’s foreign
policy. Essentially played around the dichotomy
Russia/Western Countries, it well displays Uzbekistan’s efforts to get
freedom from the influence of the former colonizer, in order to acquire
new relations, especially with the USA. After more than a decade of
independent existence for Uzbekistan, it is probably possible to say that
President Karimov’s efforts in this direction have been mostly successful.
However, the steps in this path were neither always linear, nor, appar-
ently, coherent. First of all, the Country’s leadership was deeply influ-
enced by Central Asia’s economic and military dependence on Russia in
the early 1990s; later, when Uzbekistan was provided with minimal
infrastructures allowing it to pursue different international strategies, its
foreign policy had a significant shift away from Moscow since 1996,
especially in the military field. Nevertheless, since 1999 the Islamic
insurgencies and terrorist attacks induced President Karimov to recon-
sider some decisions taken and to search a more constructive approach
toward Moscow. The attacks against the USA happened on 11
September 2001, which determined a renewed American effort in the
struggle against terrorism, changed once again the situation – maybe
definitely – promoting a strong new alliance between Washington and
Tashkent in several different fields.
The decisions analyzed in this chapter try to cast some light on this
process and its crucial events, through three ‘symbolic’ decisions, involv-
ing Uzbekistan’s participation in international organizations, and support
to US stances and projects. Another paragraph is instead devoted to show
the trend of the Uzbek-Turkish relations: Ankara was in fact one of the
major players in Central Asia – mainly thanks to common ethnic and lin-
guistic roots – in the early 1990s, while both a difficult economic situation
and the suspicions of President Karimov against the Turkic ‘elder brother’
considerably frozen the relations between the two Countries in the follow-
ing years.
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A) Variables Involved
Although it might seem strange, the sudden
statement released by President Karimov on 4 May
1995 supporting the US embargo against Iran has
most of all to be seen in an anti-Russian perspec-
tive. While some scholars use it to show the anti-
Islamic attitude of Karimov, the international events that provoked that
stance were mostly unconnected with the Islamic world and tied to the US
attempts of military penetration into the former Soviet sphere of influence
and with the problem of nuclear weapons spread (Global System). In the
early months of 1995, in fact, the Partnership for Peace NATO program
was in way of development, and president Karimov was maybe its
staunchest supporter, probably as a way of gaining US recognition
(Bilateral). As he wrote soon afterwards in his book, “we think that NATO,
which is comprised of democratic States, may become a stabilizing force
not only in the European continent, but also, by strengthening its political
structure and the ‘Partnership for peace’ program, in the vast Eurasian
region. Our participation in the ‘Partnership for Peace’ program we
regard as strengthening our independence and sovereignty”. 111 In the
same period, however, Russia (also in a difficult electoral campaign)
became wary of these new international developments, and many of its
leaders and candidates spoke out against NATO’s expansion. 112 In the
same context, another theme often treated was the destiny of the ethnic
Russian former Soviet citizens: Karimov was surely worried aboout the
words of Russia’s Foreign Minister Kozyrev that his Country was ready to
defend compatriots abroad also with arms (Dominant Bilateral). 113 Of
course (still regarding the variable Bilateral) it is impossible not to consid-
er Karimov’s view of Iran and, in general, of radical Islamic Countries. In
his book, he barely mentions Iran (as he often does with disagreeable sub-
jects), and also in his speeches it is possible to find only generic courtesy
phrases pronounced in the limited bilateral contacts between the two
Countries. Generally, it seems that Karimov did not dislike Iran’s econom-
ic cooperation unless this became cultural or religious penetration. This
attitude was well demonstrated by the President’s remark during an ECO
(Economic Cooperation Organization) summit (according to which
“attempts to transform the ECO into a political forum would necessitate
111 Karimov, op. cit., chapter 16
112 RFERL OMRI Daily Digest, April – May 1995, from the Web Site http://www.rferl.org
113 Id.
2. SUPPORT TO THE
AMERICAN EMBAR-
GO AGAINST IRAN
(MAY 1995 – EM)
Uzbekistan’s withdrawal”), 114 and by the repeated denial to Iran to estab-
lish a cultural organization in Samarkand. 115
Among the relevant variables, it would be wise not to forget the huge
Persian-speaking minority in Uzbekistan (Interest Groups) and Karimov’s
fear of a possible Iranian influence on it (maybe the primary reason for
other decisions such as the denial of the cultural center’s establishment).
Another reason for Karimov’s partial hostility against the Islamic Republic
was undoubtedly the support it gave to Fundamentalist groups in the
region, especially in the first years of Uzbekistan’s independence
(Competing Elites). 116
B) Decisional Flow
The Islamic republic of Iran, as well as other regional powers, per-
ceived in the independence acquired by the Central Asian Republics in
1991 a great opportunity to expand its political and economic sphere of
influence. As pointed out by an Iranian scholar, Tchangiz Pahlevan, his
Country followed three different lines of conduct in the early 1990s toward
Central Asia. The first one, lacking information and expertise, saw in the
independence of the new Republics a victory for Islam. In this perspective,
Iran supported Islamic movements throughout the region, and probably
also in the Ferghana Valley. Once the reluctance of the new States
(Uzbekistan in particular) to deal with the subject was detected, it adopt-
ed a new approach, trying to combine the Islamic policy with other forms
of cultural contacts: again Uzbekistan responded negatively, with the
(above-cited) denial for the Iranic cultural center in Samarkand. Thus, the
frustrated Islamic Republic had to concentrate its efforts on economic
cooperation, both through the ECO, and bilateral contacts. Its economic
exchanges with the region soared, but not significantly with Uzbekistan
(the list reported in Pahlevan’s work about the economic relations with the
CIS Countries, in fact, does not mention it). 117 Bilateral relations between
the two Countries, also in the following years, never became particularly
tight (except for the ECO meetings and special occasions such as
Rafsanjani’s tour of Central Asia in October 1993). This context suggests
that Iran was probably a perfect target for Uzbekistan to hit with symbol-
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115 Roy, 1997, op. cit.
116 Bohr, op. cit., p. 62
117 Tchangiz Pahlevan, “Iran and Central Asia”, in Atabaki and O’Kane, eds., Post-Soviet
Central Asia, Har-Anand, New Delhi, 1995, pp. 84-85
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ical actions, in order to acquire US recognition, without too much damage
for the Country.
The occasion came in 1995: while the USA and the NATO were devel-
oping the Partnership for Peace program, signing security agreements and
offering military help to Countries such as Hungary and Georgia, 118
Russia experienced the first moves of a harsh (both presidential and par-
liamentary) electoral campaign. The far right, led by the popular leader
Zhirinovsky, adopted subjects such as the NATO enlargement and the eth-
nic Russians abroad as main themes for its campaign: other politicians,
consequently, partially followed them. On 19 April, Russian news Agency
Itar-Tass quoted Foreign Minister Kozyrev saying that Russia could inter-
vene militarily to protect ethnic Russians in the “near abroad”, (notion
including also Central Asia) adding that his comments were “neither a slip
of the tongue, nor a pre-election ruse” .119 On the contrary, in the follow-
ing days, he showed surprise at the comments in the western press, since
he had allegedly been saying similar things over the previous five years,
and those words did not reportedly signal a change in Russia’s policy. 120
Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev even warned visiting U.S. Defense
Secretary William Perry on 3 April, that Russia might suspend the reduc-
tion of its conventional arms as required by the 1990 treaty on
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), should NATO expand to the east. 121
This already uneasy field was further complicated by the debate about
Russia’s help to Iran to develop a nuclear program. From reports and inter-
views of those days, it is reasonable to suppose that the USA linked the
problem to the implementation of the US economic help to the Russian
Federation. 122 Several summits took place in those days, but with little
results: the Russian leadership found itself in a very difficult situation,
between the opposite needs not to face the USA too harshly and not to
look too ready to surrender. Several declarations by prominent Russian
politicians in the months of April and May in fact mentioned the civilian
use of Russian supplies to Iran, or the exaggerations about the alleged
nuclear menace represented by Iran. 123
Karimov found in this confused situation a good opportunity to send a
118 RFERL OMRI Daily Digest, April – May 1995, from the Web Site http://www.rferl.org
119 RFERL OMRI Daily Digest, 20 April 1995, from the Web Site http://www.rferl.org
120 RFERL OMRI Daily Digest, 21 April 1995, from the Web Site http://www.rferl.org
121 RFERL OMRI Daily Digest, 4 April 1995, from the Web Site http://www.rferl.org
122 RFERL OMRI Daily Digest, 3 April 1995, from the Web Site http://www.rferl.org
123 RFERL OMRI Daily Digest, April – May 1995, from the Web Site http://www.rferl.org
clear message both to Moscow and to Washington. On 4 May, after a
meeting with the local head of the IMF, Karimov denied the feasibility of
the Russian sales of nuclear material to Iran and expressed his support to
the US embargo against the Islamic Republic saying: “We know the rea-
sons for the embargo and we support them” .124 That same day, a popular
newspaper loyal to the President condemned Kozyrev’s words about pro-
tection of the Russians abroad as “far from inoffensive”, also criticizing the
Minister’s position on the Chechen War. 125
C) Implementation; Output; Comparison
This decision probably had no implementation and no great effect on
Uzbek–Iranian relations. Interestingly, a week later, Uzbekistan’s Foreign
Minister Kamilov cancelled a visit to Iran claiming ‘illness’. When the visit
actually took place, in occasion of the formal opening of the Uzbek
embassy in Teheran, the Iranian Press Agency reported a statement by
Kamilov “rejecting the claims of some western media that his government
supported the embargo against Iran” 126 However, Bohr reports that “on
several occasions Uzbekistan has been the only Country other than Israel
to have sided with the United States in International fora on the imposition
of sanctions against Iran and Cuba”. 127 Thus, despite the occasional
denial which followed, Karimov’s stance of May 1995 probably was not
only an isolated event. Moreover, it represented the beginning of a more
assertive foreign policy toward the great superpowers, leading to the
refusal to sign the Treaty for the Defense of CIS External Borders in the
same month of May 1995 and to the first official meeting with US
President Clinton the following year.
The output, considering the whole situation, could thus be assessed as
positive, although the negative economic consequences that could have
followed Karimov’s stance are impossible to evaluate (but probably low,
given the limited share of foreign trade with Iran).
The other Central Asian Republics (as reported by the same Press
Agency quoting Karimov’s words) kept a different behavior: Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, probably because of their more developed
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trade with Iran (and in the case of Turkmenistan, of a long common border)
did not take any particular position about the embargo. Tajikistan, on the
other hand, in reason of its deep ethnic and linguistic ties with the Islamic
republic, expressed its opposition to the use of “coercive methods”. 128
A) Variables Involved
Although President Karimov at the beginning
of the 1990s talked enthusiastically about the
‘Turkish model’ of development, the relations
between the two Countries never developed as
those early days seemed to promise. First of all,
Turkey never proved rich enough to provide the new Turkic 129 Republics
with the prospected investments and aid. Moreover, Uzbekistan’s President
became more and more wary about the projects of cultural penetration (by
satellite televisions, cultural associations, etc.) made by the Turkish leader-
ship in Central Asia. He often made use of the ‘Turkic’ element (for exam-
ple in his famous speech of 1995 about “Turkestan, our common
home” 130), and in his book it is possible to find praise of the Turkic-speak-
ing States meetings (T6); however, in those lines, he never mentions Turkey.
It is evident therefore that Turkic integration in Central Asia would be
acceptable to Karimov only when promoted by Tashkent, and not by the
more powerful Ankara.
What created real crises between the two Countries, and pushed
Karimov to take decisions against Uzbekistan’s ‘elder brother’ were essen-
tially two factors: the first one represented by the presence on Turkish soil
of one of the leading opponents to Karimov in exile, Muhammad Solih
(Political System), the second by the participation in the Turkish
Government of members of an Islamic Fundamentalist party, led by the
Deputy Prime Minister Erbakan, between 1996 and 1997 (Karimov never
released public interviews about the subject, but his behavior during these
two years – as explained in the following paragraph of this work – was
eloquent enough). This last factor was just the concretization of an increas-
ing Islamist presence in Turkish society and education, and probably made
3. WITHDRAWAL 
OF STUDENTS 
FROM TURKEY 
(AUGUST 1997 – CS)
128 RFERL OMRI Daily Digest, 5 May 1995, from the Web Site http://www.rferl.org
129 This adjective identifies a cluster of nationalities linked by common ethnic and linguistic
roots: among them, Turkish, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Turkmens, Kyrgyzs, Azeris, Tatars,
Karakalpaks and Meshketians.
130 OMRI Daily Digest, 1995, from the Web Site http://www.rferl.org
Karimov particularly afraid of its influence also on young Uzbeks. The offi-
cial pretext for the withdrawal of most of the Uzbek students in Turkey
(made by Karimov in 1997) was in fact the discovery that Solih and
Turkish Islamists had reportedly tried to recruit some of them (Competing
Elites). The Uzbek leader was then particularly concerned about the mat-
ter, also because the Taliban were quickly conquering also Northern
Afghanistam, at Uzbekistan’s southern borders.
Among the relevant variables it could look obvious to include Bilateral,
since the decision just involves Uzbekistan’s bilateral relations with Turkey.
Nevertheless, there are better and more specific reasons to do so.
Assuming that Karimov really had the information about the recruitment
attempts just in August 1997, it is anyway necessary to note that the
Turkish Government involving fundamentalist forces had just fallen, and
substituted by another, in which they where not present. Karimov’s move,
therefore, could also have been (and probably was) a warning to the new
Turkish authorities to change their previous behavior toward Uzbekistan
and their cultural policy involving Central Asia.
B) Decisional Flow
When the Soviet Republics became independent, part of the Turkish pro-
gram of assistance to the new Turkic nations consisted in several thousands
of places reserved in Turkish Universities for Central Asian and Caucasian
students. Uzbekistan alone sent about 2,000 youngsters, and about 20
Turkish High Schools were opened in the Country, as well as in other former
Soviet Republics. Although Turkey was a highly secularized Country, its
educative system presented a high degree a religious (often fundamentalist)
penetration. The high Schools named Imam Hatip, in particular, provided
students with a religious education and taught Arabic as a second language
instead of English or Russian. Run by a religious brotherhood, which was
managed by the leader-businessman Fethullah Gulen (who also controlled
part of Turkey’s mass media), these schools (also named ‘lights’) boomed in
the late XXth Century, becoming the forefront of the Turkish political and eco-
nomic penetration in several Countries around the world (in Europe, they
proliferated for example in Germany, a Country with a strong Turkish minor-
ity). 131 Another peculiarity of the Turkish educational aid program to
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Uzbekistan and the other Republics was its gratuitousness (unlike, for
example, the places reserved to Uzbek students in the American
Universities). This fact not only determined positive economic conse-
quences, but proved to diminish the political control of the Uzbek
Government over the students, that did not depend on its help to carry on
their studies. 132 These two characteristics, summed together, could make
the Turkish educational help not completely acceptable to the Uzbek lead-
ership and an ideal hostage in case of political dispute.
This is just what happened in 1994, when for the first time the relations
between Turkey and Uzbekistan froze. The reason was the hospitality
given by Turkey to the Turkish dissident leader, Muhammad Solih: former
Presidential candidate in his Country and poet, Solih was probably the
means for the Turkish leadership to affirm its pan-Turkic policy, also above
the existing leaderships, and to prove its democraticity further. This first cri-
sis determined the first temporary withdrawal of some Uzbek students and
the recalling of the Uzbek ambassador. In the following year, after the visit
of the Turkish Prime Minister Ciller to Tashkent, and renewed economic
ties, the relations between the two Countries improved again (and the
Turkish authorities took the habit to expel Solih from the Country – as a
special attention toward the Uzbek leadership –, in occasion of every
high-level contact between the two Countries). 133
The situation changed again in July 1996, when legislative elections in
Turkey were won by a coalition formed by social-democrats, and the reli-
gious Welfare Party, led by Necmettin Erbakan (who became deputy
Prime Minister). This new Government began a completely new foreign
policy, much less oriented towards the former Soviet Republics, and look-
ing towards other sectors of the Islamic world. In the following years, and
especially in 1999, after the assassination attempt against him, Karimov
had much to say about these political figures. However, in the available lit-
erature, there are no statements made by him about the subject in 1996-
1997. All we know is that relations between the two Countries reached a
new degree of coldness: during the twelve months of the Ciller-Erbakan
Government, no high-level bilateral contact between the two Countries
took place. When in October 1996 Tashkent hosted the usual Turkic sum-
mit with the political leaders of Turkey and all the Turkic Countries, the lan-
W
PAP
ER
S
ORKING
DIPARTIMENTO DI STUDI POLITICI – UNIVERSITÀ DI TORINO
54
132 The CENASIA Discussion List, 9 June 2000, form the Web Site http://www.eurasianet.org
133 Gareth Winrow, “Turkish Policy in Central Asia”, in Atabaki and O’Kane, eds., op. cit.,
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guage chosen for the works was Russian (reportedly because it was “the
only language mastered by all participants”) and the Turkish President
Demirel was forced to adopt simultaneous translation. In April 1997
Karimov visited Greece, Turkey’s traditional enemy, and even declared to
“support the Greek position on Aegean and Cyprus”, and to appreciate
Greece as “a stabilizing factor in Europe and the Balkans”. 134 In mid-July
the Turkish President Demirel made an official visit to some former Soviet
Countries, among which Kyrgyzstan, where he praised democracy as the
real peacekeeping factor in the region. In the same month, pressed by the
Army, the Ciller Government fell, and was substituted by another led by
Mesut Yilmaz, not supported by the Welfare Party. However, on 25
August, Itar-Tass Agency reported that Karimov had recalled “some 2,000
Uzbek students studying in Turkey” (that is, almost the total Uzbek pres-
ence in the Turkish Universities), allegedly “after learning that under the
former government of Necmettin Erbakan, Islamic clerics who belong to
fundamentalist sects had tried to recruit those students”. 135
C) Implementation; Output; Comparison
The implementation of Karimov’s decision was immediate, and there
was no news about a comeback of the recalled students. However, in
November of the same year, high-level relations between the two
Countries were restored, with an official visit made by Karimov in Turkey.
Only in 1999 new events brought the implementation of this decision far
beyond: Karimov was allegedly informed that Erbakan had financed the
Islamic leader (and future leader of the IMU) Tohir Yuldashev with
100,000 Dollars. Furious, the Uzbek President demanded the arrest and
extradition of Solih (who was also reportedly involved in the bombing
attacks in Tashkent of February 1999, according to the Uzbek official
reconstruction), but the Turkish authorities just expelled the dissident. In
response to what was considered by Uzbekistan a criminal offence, all the
remaining Uzbek students in Turkey were recalled, the Turkish Schools in
Uzbekistan closed and banned, the Ambassador in Turkey withdrawn
again, and even some commercial contracts broken. Good relations
between the two Countries were restored only in 2000, when the patient
Turkish efforts for reconciliation received a response. 136
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The output of this decision could have been positive under the security
profile, assuming that the Uzbek Government maintained a tight political
control and the absence of any fundamentalist influence on education as
its highest priorities in the field. From the economic point of view, howev-
er, Karimov’s stance was considered as negative by all commentators,
because Uzbekistan had much more to lose than Turkey in a freezing of
relations between the two Countries.
The Turkish educational program was directed to all the Central
Asian and Azerbaijani students: even several Tajik students, although
their language is not Turkic, receive education in Turkey witnessing the
Turkish strategy of cultural penetration into the whole of Central Asia.
The program was strongly compromised by the withdrawal of
Uzbekistan, which was the main beneficiary. However, there is no infor-
mation available about similar moves made by the other Republics; the
issue of the Turkish religious Schools has instead raised concern in
Azerbaijan. 137
A) Variables Involved
This decision, although included in the
Economic-Monetary Issue Area because of its con-
tent, had nonetheless an unquestionable political
meaning in Karimov’s intention. His Country is in
fact a modest oil owner and producer and, in spite
of being the only Central Asian Country raising its
production since the Soviet times, it became a net exporter of the product
(also thanks to a contraction in domestic consumption) only in 1997. 138
Probably, in absence of strategical implications, Uzbekistan’s presence at
the Ankara meeting (sanctioned the Baku-Ceyhan route) would not have
been indispensable. 
First of all, as highlighted by Ahmed Rashid, the pipeline issue is not
but part of a wider ‘New Great Game’ played by both global and region-
al powers to gain control of Central Asia (not only because of its natural
resources, but also because of its peculiar position between the former
Soviet sphere of influence and the Islamic world, the East and the West).
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4. SUPPORT TO THE
BAKU-CEYHAN 
PIPELINE ROUTE 
(2 NOVEMBER 
1998 – EM)
137 Id., p. 132
138 EIA Country Profile, 2002, from the Web Site http://www.eia.doe.gov
Uzbekistan, in its quality as would-be regional hegemon is therefore
almost forced to take part in the game (Regional), and try to put all its
available influence on the desired side of the balance. As usual in his for-
eign policy, especially in the second half of the 1990s, Karimov took a
pro-US (Bilateral) and anti-Russian (Dominant Bilateral) stance.
The USA had never concealed their strategy, theorized by Brzezinsky
in the early 1990s, to create a belt of pipelines cutting Russia and its allies
off the Great Game. 139 This is the same aim always pursued by
Uzbekistan, trying since the moment of independence to achieve military,
energetic, infrastructural and alimentary self-sufficiency from Moscow.
Also about the pipelines, already on November 1997 (exactly one year
before the decision now analyzed), the Uzbek Prime Minister Sultanov
declared to the press, during a trip to Washington, that his Country “sup-
ported plans to transport oil from the Caspian Sea across Georgia and
Turkey to world markets, by-passing Russia”. 140 The main problem in fol-
lowing such a strategy is that Central Asia is several hundreds of
Kilometers far from the open sea, and the shortest route to reach it must
necessary cross Iran or Afghanistan. The former has been ruled since
1979 by a fundamentalist regime, disagreed not only by Tashkent, but
also by Washington (see for example the decision on the embargo against
Iran, above). The latter appeared for some time as a more feasible route,
through an agreement with the different struggling factions; however, with
the almost complete conquest of the Country made by the Taliban in 1997-
1998, Uzbekistan followed the USA in abandoning this perspective.
Especially considering the rising tension between these two southern
neighbors during 1998, it was more urgent than ever to find an alterna-
tive solution.
In that period, however, already before the February 1999 attacks, the
crackdown on Islamist militants in Uzbekistan had intensified, along with
the worried statements of the Tashkent administration about terrorist activ-
ity in the Country (Competing Elites) that made it necessary more than ever
not to become an economic hostage of the turbulent southern neighbors.
Thus, the Economic factors must not be neglected while considering this
issue, given Uzbekistan’s need to find new ways to export its products
toward the west; however, they cannot be considered as crucial for this
LUCA OZZANO - UZBEKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY (1991-2001)
W
PAP
ER
S
ORKING
57
139 Rashid, Ahmed, Talebani. Islam, Petrolio e il Grande Scontro in Asia Centrale,
Feltrinelli, Milano, 2001
140 BBC News, 26 November 1997, from the Web Site http://www.bbc.co.uk
decision, since the option chosen was neither the quickest to realize, nor
the more economically suitable (as witnessed even by some US perplexi-
ties). 141 Worthwhile to be mentioned is also Uzbekistan’s need to be con-
nected by an integrated system of infrastructures to regions such as the
Caucasus and Europe (Other Regional).
B) Decisional Flow
Uzbekistan is the third largest natural gas producer among the CIS
Countries, but this huge production is mainly destined to domestic con-
sumption and to export to the neighbors and to Russia through the exist-
ing Soviet infrastructures. It also has minor oil reserves, that anyway
allowed it to become an exporter Country in 1997. 142 When this hap-
pened, the Uzbek leadership was involved in a dispute about the most suit-
able ways of transport that had been going on since the earliest times of
Central Asian independence, when the resources of the region were made
free from the Soviet Control. The actors involved in this ‘New Great
Game’, as theorized by Ahmed Rashid, 143 are first of all Russia and the
USA, in addition to a second rank of regional powers, such as Turkey,
China, Pakistan and Iran, all competing for getting the best opportunities
while excluding their adversaries. A primary role in this field has more-
over been played by the giant oil companies, often powerful enough to
influence the decisions of their Governments, and not rarely tightly con-
nected with them, openly or covertly.
In the 1990s, the dispute about the possible oil transport routes devel-
oped around several options, some already realized, some others just
planned. The main choices on the table were: 144
• Northern routes, towards Russia, directly to the north via
Kazakhstan or crossing Azerbaijan and Chechnya toward the
Russian port of Novorossisk. Several pipelines already exist on this
route, but there are plans to develop it.
• Western Routes (favored by Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and the
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USA), through Azerbaijan and Georgia to the Georgian port of
Supsa on the Black Sea (in activity since 2000), or to the Turkish port
of Ceyhan, on the Mediterranean.
• Southern routes, through Iran, much more economically suitable but
adversed by the USA because of political reasons (a line between
Turkmenistan and Iran is however already active).
• Eastern routes, through China, essentially independent from the
other options, not yet under construction.
• South Eastern routes, through Afghanistan to Pakistan, economically
suitable, but with problems of instability in the regions crossed. This
is the case of the old project of the Central Asia Oil Pipeline and of
the US Unocal project, stalled for same reason as the southern routes.
When Central Asia became independent, the major oil companies did
not perceive immediately the new opportunities offered, partly discour-
aged by the lack of information, partly by the expenses necessary to build
new infrastructures in the region. The fist firm to work in the region was in
fact a second-rank Argentinean Company, Bridas, which signed the first
contract with Turkmenistan in the early days of independence, planning
the construction of a pipeline crossing Afghanistan toward the Pakistani
shore of the Indian Ocean. However, in the mid-1990s the USA became
increasingly aware of the strategic importance of the Central Asian region
and of the control of its resources. Therefore, the US Company Unocal,
supported by its Government, proposed a similar project (with a partici-
pation also of the Saudi firm Delta) to the Countries involved, and won the
competition thanks to its political sponsors. The main stake in this opera-
tion was to find an agreement with the different warlords (who included,
as of 1994, also the Taliban) that were contending Afghanistan with each
other with arms in a never ending civil war. 145
In the meantime, Russia also had to solve problems created by the
instability in Chechnya, through which the pipeline to Novorossisk had
necessarily to pass (what also probably represented the main reason for
the bloody war led by the Russian Army in the Country).
For some years, the South-Eastern pipeline was optimistically supported
by the Governments of Pakistan and the USA. However, both Governments
and oil Companies never managed to find an agreement with the different
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factions fighting for supremacy in Afghanistan. The Taliban at one point
were even supported as the only force able to reunify the Country and grant
the necessary stability, by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and (according to
authoritative voices such as that of Rashid) by the USA, mostly through the
respective secret services. Nevertheless, the construction of the pipeline was
continuously postponed, and the USA grew more and more skeptical about
the option, especially when the US feminist groups started to harshly criti-
cize Afghanistan’s segregationist policy toward women, and the Country
gave hospitality to the organization of Usama bin Laden. 146
These factors, taken together, probably determined a surprising change
in the US Administration, which in July 1997 announced that it was ready
to support a pipeline from Turkmenistan to Turkey, even crossing Iran. 147
The American attention definitely shifted away from the Afghan route after
the terrorist attacks of Summer 1998 against US Embassies in Africa: mis-
siles were launched against bin Laden’s camps in the Country and a few
days later Unocal officially announced the suspension of the pipeline con-
struction plans. 148 The American attention progressively focused on the
route crossing Azerbaijan and Georgia toward the port of Supsa, allow-
ing the two Countries of the recently formed (and anti-Russia) GUAM
(Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova; GUUAM after the adhesion of
Uzbekistan) to be involved in the affair. It was not a case that Uzbekistan,
almost in the same period, expressed (as cited in the previous paragraph)
its preference for pipelines bypassing Russia, while preparing its with-
drawal from the CIS Security Agreement and its adhesion to GUAM.
In September 1998, twelve countries (including Azerbaijan, Bulgaria,
Kazakhstan, Romania, Turkey, and Uzbekistan) signed a multilateral
agreement known as the Baku Declaration “to develop the transport corri-
dor through closer economic integration of member countries, rehabilita-
tion and development of new transportation infrastructure, and by foster-
ing stability and trust in the region”. 149
In the end, allegedly because of environmental concerns about the
safety of the Bosphorus, but mostly to involve also the US pivot ally in the
region, Turkey, in the affair, the preference of the USA was given to the
Baku-Ceyhan route. Meanwhile, the southern and southwestern options
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had become less and less realizable, also given the rising tension between
Iran and Afghanistan, near to a state of war. 150 Even more worrying for
Uzbekistan, on 20 October, its border guards discovered in a train travel-
ing from Iran to Afghanistan two wagons filled with weapons, whose des-
tination remained unclear. 151 Nearly in the same days, during the first offi-
cial visit paid by Russia’s President in Uzbekistan, Yeltsin and Karimov had
agreed on the gravity of the situation in Afghanistan and signed a docu-
ment of mutual assistance in case of attack. 152 All these factors probably
determined Karimov to participate in the Ankara meeting of 2 November,
and give his support to the Baku-Ceyhan route. 153
C) Implementation; Output; Comparison
The November 1998 decision did not require any implementation
specifically to Uzbekistan, which was not technically involved in the proj-
ect. More generally, the eastern option continued to raise doubts both from
Oil Companies and from some Governments (such as Iran, Azerbaijan,
Turkmenistan and Russia, although for different reasons. The USA, too, the
same day of the Ankara summit, officially stated to be bound to a “multi-
ple pipeline project” in the region. 154 This strategic option, however, was
supported in the following months more and more seriously by the US
Administration, becoming its leading issue in the region: therefore, every
resistance was finally overcome. The construction of the pipeline has
allegedly started in summer 2002, in order to be completed before the end
of 2004 (according to the US will). 155 However, the new regional situation
after the war in Afghanistan could reorient the US Administration toward
other options in the future.
The output of the decision for Uzbekistan can not be assessed but in
purely political terms: in this perspective, the decision was just part of a
process leading the country to take place among the US’ staunchest allies
in the region, especially by entering the GUAM (already including two of
the Countries most involved in the project, Azerbaijan and Georgia). Thus,
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the effects of these decisions will be revealed only by the medium and long
term effects of the Uzbek participation in this alliance.
Two of the other Central Asian Countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,
possessed at that time neither the natural resources not the political rele-
vance necessary to be involved in the deal. Kazakhstan supported the
project enthusiastically, although already selling oil and gas to Russia
through the existing pipelines and participating in other projects foresee-
ing the construction of pipelines toward China. Turkmenistan’s President
Niyazov, on the contrary, officially refused to sign the agreement on 4
November, reportedly because his Country was more interested in gas
than in oil deals, and had moreover already signed a separate supply
agreement with Turkey. The true reasons were probably Turkmenistan’s dis-
pute with Azerbaijan about the offshore fields in the Caspian, its political
position (much closer to Russia), and its will to conclude cheaper deals
(with its southern neighbor Iran). 156
A) Variables Involved
When the announcement of Uzbekistan’s acces-
sion to the Shanghai organization (Shanghai-5,
later Shanghai-6 or, more officially, Shanghai
Forum) was given, the international community
was taken by surprise. It was almost unbelievable that a Country follow-
ing for years a path toward the West, and the USA in particular (with its
climax in the withdrawal from the CIS Security treaty and the adhesion to
the pro-US GUAM), suddenly entered a security organization including
both China and Russia. A deeper analysis of events and statements
released in the previous two years, however, reveals many factors that
could be involved in the decision.
The first one of them is undoubtedly the change in the security needs of
the Country. Although repeatedly calling for a massive action against
Islamic terrorism, the Uzbek leadership for years had practically to face no
serious menace on this side (situation that made some analysts believe that
the Islamic threat was no more than a Karimov’s pretext to justify his
repressive human rights policy). The year 1999 represented a turning
point in this trend: both the bombing attack, which took place on 16
W
PAP
ER
S
ORKING
DIPARTIMENTO DI STUDI POLITICI – UNIVERSITÀ DI TORINO
62
5. ADHESION TO
THE ‘SHANGHAI-5’
(APRIL 2001 – MS)
156 Michael Levyveld, “Turkmenistan: President Refuses to Sign Oil Pipeline Agreement”, 4
November 1998, from the Web Site http://www.rferl.org
February in Tashkent against Karimov, and the first IMU incursions the fol-
lowing summer posed a serious challenge to the regime (Military
Capability). The already crucial anti-terrorism policy, therefore, became
an absolute priority in Karimov’s agenda (Competing Elites), with the
immediate need to find powerful and reliable allies. After repeatedly call-
ing for an international cooperative solution about the issue (as for exam-
ple appears in Karimov’s speech at the United Nations Millennium Summit
in September 2000 157), he probably felt frustrated not to find enough of
attention in Western Administrations. This probably induced him to decide
to search for cooperation elsewhere. Just on that period, in fact, the new
Putin’s Government was leading Russia toward a renewed interest in its
former sphere of influence. Although wary of these new imperial tempta-
tions of the former ‘elder brother’, Karimov perfectly perceived the com-
monality of interests with the regional power, then engaged in an endless
struggle against its own Islamic fighters (Dominant Bilateral). Also China,
which was not only politically and economically interested in expanding
its influence in the Central Asian region, but also sincerely worried about
the Islamic separatists of Xinjang, appeared very sensitive about the issue
(Bilateral). Both Countries therefore appeared inclined to supply
Uzbekistan with the anti-guerrilla military equipment it needed so much
after the difficult experience of the incursions of the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan.
Other less important reasons for the decision were Uzbekistan’s desire
not to be completely excluded from the games of power in the region
(Regional). After its withdrawal from the CIS Collective Security Treaty, the
latter had considerably strengthened, while GUUAM was facing several
difficulties. The danger for Uzbekistan was to remain isolated in the mid-
dle of a strongly integrated military region headed by Russia. For the same
reason, when Uzbekistan entered the Shanghai-5, there were rumors of a
new adhesion to the CIS Security Pact. 158 Other observers suspected
instead that Tashkent’s real intention was to develop China’s aims to
acquire influence in Central Asia in an anti-Russian perspective, and
reports of Moscow’s dissatisfaction seemed to confirm this opinion. 159
Finally, the adhesion to the Shanghai-5 surely represented an indirect mes-
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sage sent to the USA, officially ‘strategic partner’ of Uzbekistan, but in
reality rather deaf about the terrorism issue.
B) Decisional Flow
The Shanghai-5 Organization was created as an informal group of
States (including China, Russia, and, among the Central Asians,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) to meet annually in order to dis-
cuss the delimiting and demilitarizing of the CIS-China borders.
Uzbekistan did not participate, not only because of its foreign policy
choices of the mid-1990s, but also for the obvious reason that the Country
had no common border with China. After an initial success, the Group
widened its scope, also addressing the issue of terrorism: an agreement
was reached on this subject during the 1999 meeting in Bishkek.
Meanwhile, just a few days after Uzbekistan’s announcement of its with-
drawal from the CIS Security Treaty, on 16 February 1999, one of the main
squares of Tashkent was wasted by a horrible explosion, which left on the
ground 16 victims and several dozens of wounded. Although the involve-
ment of Islamic extremists was proved by several trials with death sentences,
no claiming was reportedly made. On the contrary, when in the following
summer, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan were penetrated by a commando seiz-
ing hostages, the responsibility was immediately attributed to the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan, with bases in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, and
close links with Usama bin Laden’s terrorist network. The guerrillas engaged
the two Countries’ security forces for months, until late October, when the
last hostages were released, reportedly in exchange of a rich ransom. 160 In
response to the incursion, not long after the Uzbek Armed Forces held joint
military exercises with the Russian, Kyrgyz, Kazakh and Tajik forces, and
planned another for the following spring. 161 Between the end of 1999 and
the beginning of 2000 Uzbekistan also strengthened its border policy (see
above the decision analyzed in chapter 3).
In the following April, the visiting US Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright declared: «We intend to provide approximately $3 million in
assistance for equipment and training to help Uzbekistan combat terror-
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ism and the illicit trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, conventional
arms and narcotics and the assistance will be provided through the State
Department’s anti-terrorist assistance program, non-proliferation export
control and border security assistance programs and counter-narcotics
and law enforcement training programs.”. The two Countries, however,
did not agree about the economic and human rights issues, crucial for
Washington’s Administration. 162 In the meantime, meeting Putin in May
2000 (for the first time in his quality of Russia’s President), Karimov rec-
ognized the legitimacy of Russia’s interest in Uzbekistan and, although
there was no official report about the visit, sources reported that the two
Presidents discussed mostly about security and the danger of terrorism. 163
On July 5, Karimov attended for the first time a Summit of the Shanghai
Forum in Dushanbe, and expressed “the desire either to cooperate with the
Forum or to join it”. The following month, the Uzbek authorities adopted a
much more cooperative position toward the neighboring Countries when
new IMU incursions flared, and even signed a bilateral security agreement
with Kyrgyzstan, overcoming the strained relations of the previous year.
Karimov officially announced on 29 August that China was providing mil-
itary aid to Uzbekistan, while a similar Russian supply was categorically
denied by the Uzbek Foreign Minister Kamilov as “wishful thinking”. 164 In
the same period, Karimov rarely mentioned the GUUAM in statements,
while there were rumors that Uzbekistan could rejoin the CIS Security Pact
already in Bishkek, at the October 11 summit (however, the event did not
actually happen). 165
The following year began with rumors of a possible full participation of
Uzbekistan in the Shanghai Organization. However, it was only after a
visit by an even more friendly Putin to the Country (when Karimov
expressed the will of cooperating with Russia in every direction and
denied to follow a foreign policy leading Uzbekistan to distance itself from
Moscow), 166 in early May, that Karimov officially announced that his
Country accepted the invitation received to join the Shanghai group,
whose “main focus would be regional security”. 167
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C) Implementation; Output; Comparison
The implementation of the decision took place in Shanghai on 14-15
June 2001, when Uzbekistan was officially admitted to the group. On this
occasion, the leaders of the six member Countries signed an agreement on
combating terrorism, extremism and separatism, and agreed to the estab-
lishment of a common anti-terrorist center. The participants also expressed
their interest in deepening and strengthening their trade and commercial
relations. 168 More importantly, another agreement was signed in support
of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, threatened by Washington’s
intentions to build up a missile defense shield. The meeting was followed
by other agreements increasing cooperation also in the energy field and
in other sectors, with a particular tight cooperation between Russia and
China.
The short-term output of the decision was positive, enabling Uzbekistan
to get new resources from powerful neighbors in order to fight Islamic
extremism, while also launching a clear message to the new US
Administration. However, the strengthening of Washington’s ties with
Russia and some Central Asian Republics after the events of Fall 2001,
suggests that also the USA could be involved in the organization someway
in the future. Of course, the effects of these new developments on
Uzbekistan are impossible to foresee.
As already seen, three Central Asian Countries, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, were co-founding members of the organiza-
tion, both because of their Russia-dependent foreign policy, and their need
of security guarantees against Islamic Militants (all of them provided with
an Army much weaker than Uzbekistan’s). 169 Turkmenistan, faithful to its
formula of ‘permanent neutrality’ never took into account the opportunity
to enter the Shanghai organization, although relying on bilateral cooper-
ation with Russia for the defense of its boundaries.
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CHAPTER 5
The 2001 Afghan War
The historical centers of today’s Uzbekistan
(such as Bukhara) and Afghanistan (such as Kabul
and Herat) were built on the Silk Road, commer-
cially linking the West and the North with India and
China. Thus, despite the limited common border shared by the two Countries,
Uzbekistan is still forced to be an essential connection between its southern
neighbor and the rest of the world. The USSR invasion of 1979 took place
along the road connecting Termez, in Uzbekistan, with the Afghan town of
Mazar-i-Sharif; and the same route (crossing the border marked by the Amu
Darya river through what was unhappily called “Friendship Bridge”) a
decade later saw the withdrawal of the same troops. In this campaign, also
the Uzbek military bases in the south, such as Termez and Khanabad played
a primary role in logistic support to the Red Army, while many of the soldiers
employed came from the Central Asian region. The ethnical links are also
strong, represented by a strong Uzbek community (1.5 mln. estimated in
2001) 170 mainly settled in the northern region around Mazar-i-Sharif and
Konduz.
When Central Asia got its independence in 1991, the three southern
Republics bordering Afghanistan had to draw up a foreign policy toward the
turbulent neighbor, mainly consisting in avoiding a spillover of its widespread
conflict. Tajikistan did not manage in this, as it was also involved in a civil
war, becoming the rearguard of the Tajik faction led by Massood;
Turkmenistan, on the contrary, quietly continued to perpetuate commercial
relations involving both smuggling and gas purchase, relying on Russia to
defend its borders. Uzbekistan’s leadership, proudly refusing Moscow’s pro-
tection, had to find a different strategy in order to avoid Tajikistan’s fate.
Karimov, according to most scholars, decided then to rely on the Uzbek fac-
tion of Afghanistan (led by the warlord and former Red Army Official
Dostum) to create a buffer zone of stability protecting its southern region from
further Islamic influence 171. With this purpose, Tashkent allegedly started to
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provide Dostum with funds and arms (some commentators even talk of
Karimov’s dream of a ‘Great Uzbekistan’ absorbing Dostum’s provinces). 172
Karimov never admitted these links officially, although recognizing that his
Country supplied Dostum with “electric power, grain, medicine, and other
humanitarian aid”. 173 According to Ahmed Rashid, Moscow also provid-
ed aid to Dostum’s faction for the same reason. 174 On the contrary, among
the other factions, the main threat to Tashkent was represented by
Massood, because of the large Tajik minority settled in southern
Uzbekistan, that could easily have been involved in an alternative project
of ‘Great Tajikistan’. 175
For several years, Karimov’s strategy worked well, and also after the
rise of the Talibans Dostum continued to control the six northern Provinces
of Afghanistan, while the Uzbek leader unsuccessfully tried to coagulate a
wide anti-Taliban coalition involving Russia and Central Asia after
1994. 176 While allegedly an unreliable political figure, deeply involved in
smuggling and other obscure business, and easy to change his allies,
Dostum managed until 1996 to make his provinces the only part of
Afghanistan untouched by the Civil War, where the ethnic Uzbeks contin-
ued to lead a quiet life following western-oriented patterns. 177
Everything changed in May 1997, when the betrayal of General Malik
and of other Dostum’s subordinates handed his fief over to the Taliban,
who tried to submit the northern Provinces, while the Warlord fled to
Turkey via Uzbekistan. However, the ungratefulness of the Taliban toward
Malik’s faction soon compromised their agreement, and while Malik’s
forces took control again over four Provinces, Massood launched a coun-
teroffensive in the South, bringing about the worst defeat ever undergone
by the Taliban. However, the following repatriation of Dostum with a harsh
struggle with Malik and also the Hazara forces for the control of northern
Afghanistan, definitively handed most of the territory to the Taliban in
August 1998. 178
This event caused great dismay in Uzbekistan’s leadership, which saw
its eternal foes, the Islamic fundamentalists, pressing at the southern bor-
W
PAP
ER
S
ORKING
DIPARTIMENTO DI STUDI POLITICI – UNIVERSITÀ DI TORINO
68
172 Capisani, op. cit., p. 97
173 Bohr, op. cit., p. 55
174 Rashid, 2001, op. cit., p. 184
175 Id., p. 183
176 Id., p. 184
177 Id., p. 79
178 Id., pp. 80-97
ders. The following year found the Country in deep difficulties, stricken
both by the mysterious February bombing attack in Tashkent, and by the
IMU first incursion in the summer. Karimov openly stressed the Taliban’s
responsibility in those events, publicly stating that the terrorists came from
training camps and bases located in Afghanistan. 179 Between 1999 and
2000 he repeatedly called for a wide international anti-terrorism coalition,
without great success (after the 9/11 attacks, he would several times recall
these unheard prophetic words). In this period, Uzbekistan received
indeed military and anti-guerrilla help from several regional and global
powers, such as the USA, Turkey, Israel and, despite previous statements,
also Russia. However, Karimov probably decided that this was insufficient
to eliminate the source of regional problems, and in October 2000 took
the decision to try to improve the Uzbek-Afghan bilateral relations: high
level meetings between the two Governments started. The Uzbek President
surprisingly declared that the Taliban “did not represent a threat to central
Asia”; among the subjects treated was even the recognition of the Afghan
Government by Uzbekistan (at that time, only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and
the Emirates has formal diplomatic relation with Kabul). 180 The negotiates,
carried on secretly, allegedly did not bring any positive results.
Thus, in 2001, Tashkent was still waiting for new IMU incursions, taken
for granted as soon as the mountain passes would be reopened after the
winter freeze. In this perspective, Uzbekistan decided to enter the (always
neglected before) security agreement named Shanghai Five (Shanghai Six
after Uzbekistan’s accession), including also Russia, China, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Mysteriously, no incursion took place: the
events would later reveal that the IMU leader Juma Namangani had been
recalled to Afghanistan in order to become the commander of the ethni-
cally-mixed Al Qaeda forces.
A) Variables Involved
The Uzbek leadership always reportedly
longed for being recognized as an ally by the USA
and for a tight military (but also economic and
political) cooperation with them. Karimov, even
before the bombing attacks of February 1999 in Tashkent, was one of the
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staunchest supporters in the world for a global anti-terrorist crusade. The
events following the attacks to the Twin Towers and the pentagon gave him
the chance to realize these two ‘dreams’. Hosting US troops and also the
aircraft employed against the Taliban were therefore an obvious choice:
this does not imply it was simple to realize. The statements made by
Karimov reveal it well: they are contradictory with each other in a way that
only the differences in sources could partly explain without calling that
behavior ‘schizophrenic’. The truth was probably that after every public
announcement about Uzbekistan’s role in the Afghan campaign, Karimov
had to sustain harsh pressures not only made by the former hegemon,
Russia, but also by the neighboring Countries, worried about the prefer-
ential US–Uzbek relation. What will always probably remain obscure is
the position of the different Uzbek factions, which, in turn, could have
exercised pressures on Karimov. Undoubtedly, the President was afraid of
the public opinion’s reactions, which convinced him of the necessity of a
strict censorship on the news about the nearby war.
Despite the President’s contradictory words, the flow of events reveals
that the decision of hosting the US troops in some Uzbek military infra-
structures was taken between the days immediately following 9/11 and
the beginning of October. It is also evident that those days were filled with
both open and secret negotiations, mainly about the warranties the
Central Asian Republic wanted to receive in exchange for its support to the
US action. The first concrete and complete account for these events was
given by Karimov only when the war had practically ended, and
Afghanistan was completely freed from the Taliban. The occasion for this
was a long speech pronounced by the President at a session of the Uzbek
Parliament, in which only at the end Karimov addressed the dangerous
issue of the US bases in Uzbekistan. After a long and careful introduction
about the war and the situation in Afghanistan, he started saying: ”Today
some of political forces, state officials, public figures and the media, and
primarily some states of the near and far abroad are mostly concerned of
the US military’s stationing in an airdrome designated by Uzbekistan, and
the further fate of this airdrome”. 181
The airdrome cited by Karimov was the Khanabad base, where the
American troops and planes were settled since probably the first days of
October 2001. The concern in part of the international community and of
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Uzbekistan’s own public opinion was “whether American troops will stay
here permanently or temporarily, and […] the plans of these military
forces for the future”. 182 In justifying the US presence in Uzbekistan,
Karimov then moved to explain the reasons pushing him to host these
forces (particularly important, since after withdrawing from the CIS
Collective Security Pact, he had openly declared the intention not to be
part of any military bloc). In this context, he explained that “there are no
other goals for our efforts but the interests of our nation, country, future
generations, and our peaceful life”. Consequently, he wondered “who and
what can contradict the establishment of long-term and mutual beneficial
ties and relations of our country and the United States of America, the
most powerful country in the world (Bilateral) […] of great importance for
our security (Military Capability), in the creation of a free and prosperous
country as well as in bring[ing] the formation of a market economy
(Economic Capability)”. What are, first of all, the enemies that could
endanger Uzbekistan’s security, making US protection necessary? They
are “hostile forces, blood-thirsty and cruel people who call themselves ‘true
Muslims’, and by announcing ‘jihad’ create hostility on behalf of the reli-
gion”. In these lines one can clearly see the reference to Islamic movements
such as the IMU and Hizb-ut Tahrir, working underground in order to sub-
vert secular rule in the Country (Competing Elites), as well as the
President’s attempt to justify the repression operated against them.
Among the other relevant variables, the obvious ones are Dominant
Bilateral (since the military alliance with the USA represents not only a step
toward the West, but also a step away from the old colonizer), and Other
Regional (always in the perspective of moving away from a system of
alliances toward another). Another variable can be inferred from
Karimov’s same speech, when he blames “the attempts to strike a deal with
these ignorant terrorists and the evil forces behind them, following the
principle ‘Don’t bother me, and I will leave you alone’”, adding explicitly
that “unfortunately, some of our neighbors and friends did not escape this
temptation”, and condemning their attitude “to show that they are staunch
fighters against terrorism every time they notice the situation change”. 183
He surely talked about Tajikistan, for a long time hosting terrorist camps,
but also probably about Countries like Turkmenistan, quietly doing busi-
ness with the Taliban until 2001 (Regional).
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B) Decisional Flow
The summer 2001 passed by with Uzbekistan always in search for
allies and means in its struggle against terrorism, unusually dormant
that year, although engaging the Uzbek security forces near Tashkent
on 30 August. Uzbekistan had just received military supplies from
China, and rumors spread by Itar-Tass about a request of weapons to
Russia were immediately and categorically denied by Uzbekistan’s
Foreign Minister Kamilov. 184 On 9 September a suicide attack made by
alleged Moroccan citizens with Belgian passports killed Commander
Massood of the Northern Alliance (although his death was confirmed
only days later, when the fact was connected to Al Qaeda’s strategies).
On 11 September two civilian planes hijacked by Islamic terrorists hit
and destroyed the Twin Towers of New York, and another wasted part
of the Pentagon complex. While the rest of the world watched the unbe-
lievable images, Uzbekistan remained unaware, since the Uzbek tele-
vision decided not to interrupt the broadcasting of the President Tennis
Cup. 185
Although without any official claiming, the attacks were almost
immediately attributed to the Al Qaeda terrorist network, already
responsible in the previous years for acts of terrorism against the USA
in Tanzania, Kenya, and Yemen; and despite the Saudi nationality of
both the leader of the group, Usama bin Laden, and most of the suicide
hijackers, it was immediately clear also to Central Asia that the first tar-
get of the ‘First War of the Twenty-First Century declared by the US
President Bush was doomed to be Afghanistan, hosting the main Al
Qaeda bases. Thus, while all the leaders sent their Countries’ condo-
lences to the USA, they also started to be concerned about how they
would be involved in the following events. Russia also made their
moves, with Defense Minister Ivanov declaring that “NATO should not
even consider using Central Asia for military operations against
Afghanistan”.
Karimov, however, responded to Ivanov’s words warning that “we
didn’t assume any responsibility that we would always coordinate our
foreign policy with anybody”, adding that his main concern was the liq-
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uidation of terrorists. On the same day, Foreign Minister Kamilov made a
surprising announcement, declaring Uzbekistan “open to allowing the
United States to use Uzbek airspace or territory for an attack across its 80-
mile border with Afghanistan”, despite threats by the Taliban to retaliate
against any neighbor that helped America. Kamilov also said that the
Uzbek Government was “prepared to discuss all the possible forms of
cooperation in this respect”. The US Secretary of State Colin Powell
echoed this, affirming that the USA had not made specific requests to
Uzbekistan, but also that soon “we will be talking with the Uzbek author-
ities”. 186
From these words we could assume that the decision had already
been taken, and that Uzbekistan needed only a negotiation in order to
get as many as possible warranties of security and rewards from the
USA. In the meantime, the other Central Asian Countries appeared more
reluctant to make similar statements, with Kyrgyzstan authorities warning
instead of a possible spillover of the Afghan conflict. In the meantime,
Russia took a softer position on the issue, maybe considering the possible
advantages that it was possible in turn to get in exchange for coopera-
tion. 187 On 19 September Ivanov was in Washington to discuss the issue,
and also other Central Asian Countries, such as Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan, took a stance similar to Uzbekistan’s. Meanwhile, rumors
spread that the IMU leader, Juma Namangani, had joined the Taliban in
Afghanistan. 188 However, meeting in Tashkent on 19 September with vis-
iting Russian Security Council Secretary Vladimir Rushailo, the Uzbek
President Islam Karimov affirmed that “Uzbekistan has not yet given any
commitments and not held any talks with the United States on providing
its airspace and military bases for strikes on Afghanistan”. 189 Maybe the
President wanted to meet some Russian pressure of the moment; another
hypothesis is that he wanted to receive some positive message from the
USA that had not yet come. Maybe the response to these doubts, if they
really existed, was the recognition made by the US President Bush in a TV
speech, of the IMU among the forces backing Al Qaeda. At least this was
the interpretation of Bush’s words, made by the American press, while the
first unofficial news about the landing of “at least two military cargos”
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unloading unspecified materials in Uzbekistan spread, 190 also confirmed
by Radio Free Europe. 191 On 25 September other Central Asian Countries
upgraded their military cooperation with the USA, offering the use of
their airspace for the operations against Afghanistan. 192 On the same
day, Russia’s President Putin affirmed: “Russia is supplying and intends to
continue to supply all the information we have about the infrastructure
and the location of international terrorists and their training bases.
Second, we are ready to offer Russian airspace for airplanes with
humanitarian aid for the region where the antiterrorist action will be car-
ried out. Third, we have agreed on this position with our allies, including
Central Asian states.” 193
All the obstacles to an effective Uzbek participation to the Afghan cam-
paign led by the USA seemed thus removed. However, both Central Asian
and US sources continued to officially deny any landing of warplanes with
troops in the region. 194 The situation appeared more and more confused
when Karimov stated on 26 September that Russians “do not like the fact
that Uzbekistan is carrying out its own independent policy with regard to
U.S. use of its facilities in the counterterrorism effort. But let me say once
again that when the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan in 1979, starting a
big war, no one asked for our approval”. However, at the same time,
Karimov said that he was “absolutely against” any involvement in any con-
flict with the Taliban. 195 The following day, he changed his position again,
offering the Uzbek airspace as long as Uzbekistan’s security was guaran-
teed. Presidential Press Secretary Rustam Djumaev added: “The most impor-
tant thing is the security of our country and of our borders. When we ask
for guarantees to secure them, we rely on the basic principles of interna-
tional relations and international laws. These are the respect and acknowl-
edgement of the independence and sovereignty of states, the sanctity of bor-
ders, non-interference in the domestic affairs of the states, et cetera.” 196 On
28 September, U.S. Undersecretary of State John Boulton visited Tashkent to
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discuss antiterrorism measures with the Uzbek leadership. Probably he had
been in Uzbekistan since September 26, but his presence had been kept
secret. 197 Whatever the problems were, they were probably solved, and the
way to a definitive cooperation paved: on 5 October the US Secretary to
Defense Rumsfeld visited Uzbekistan (at the request of President Bush him-
self) as the only Central Asian destination of a tour including also Saudi
Arabia, Egypt and Oman. On 3 October, the Washington Post reported that
1,000 troops of the US Army’s 10th Mountain Division had been deployed
the day before in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. 198 On 5 October, Karimov and
Rumsfeld met: although Karimov officially declared that the USA had been
allowed to use one Uzbek basis and only for humanitarian and search-and-
rescue purposes, and to deny the rumors of US troops deployment, 199
Rumsfeld had undoubtedly received the answers the US Administration was
waiting for. Two days later, the US strikes against Afghanistan began.
C) Implementation; Output; Comparison
The implementation of the agreements signed between Karimov and
Rumsfeld on 5 October (whatever their content could be) was as fast as the
operations to carry on in neighboring Afghanistan required. Probably, the
deployment of US troops and planes in the Country had already begun
days before, while the agreement fixed the exact terms necessary to
upgrade the cooperation to an operational level. Already the following
day, US Officials told BBC that “about 1,000 US troops have arrived
Uzbekistan in the first major deployment of ground forces in the campaign
against terrorism” (probably the same soldiers already unofficially report-
ed in the Country since the end of September). The same report stressed
that it was the first time the American troops were deployed for opera-
tional duties on former Soviet territory, and that also intelligence coopera-
tion between the two Countries had increased. 200 On 9 October Pentagon
sources pointed out that the American forces had settled in the Khanabad
base, about 100 Km. from the Afghan border; CNN also reported
Karimov repeating the previous statements about the basis destination, but
adding that “he was not going to investigate too much on what kind of
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troops were going to be deployed” there. CNN added that operations
were conducted in maximum secrecy, with no civilian allowed to approach
the base. 201 Better informed Indian sources (citing an anonymous Uzbek
Officer) informed that “so far, as many as 60 planes have dropped off
supplies and 110 more are expected […] over 1,200 soldiers were on the
ground […]”, included not only the 10th Mountain Division, but also “mem-
bers of the 5th Special Forces Group”, and “an advance party from the
Special Operation Command”. In addition to the soldiers, Americans had
deployed in Khanabad “seven helicopters – four Chinooks and three
Blackhawks”. The soldiers were both “conducting test flights inside the
base”, and “repairing the runways and other structures, some of which
were in poor state”, while “two journalists have been detained […] for
venturing too close”. 202
The short-term output was problematic for Uzbekistan, which had to
face both internal and external difficulties during the campaign. While
the Taliban, according to Russian sources, had deployed 10,000 troops
on the borders with the Republic, and regional powers such as Russia,
China and Iran expressed their perplexities about the presence of US
troops in Central Asia, the Uzbek public opinion was reportedly worried
about a move that could lead to a conflict with the Taliban, whenever the
Americans would leave, and confused about the misinformation and,
often, the absolute absence of information. In a long-term perspective,
however, the benefits for Uzbekistan proved invaluable: first of all, the
first enemy of the Country, the Taliban Government which also support-
ed the IMU, had been removed, unblocking also the commercial routes
leading South; the Republic had got what appeared as a permanent US
military presence. Already in the following days new contracts were
signed with American firms (according to the Wall Street Journal, as a
reward for cooperation) 203; Uzbekistan also sent to the IMF a letter of
goodwill about future reforms, probably expecting some encouraging
shift also in the Fund’s orientation. The World bank announced that
Uzbekistan could “expect new loans, debt relief, and further benefits
from international financial institutions, and was sending a top official to
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Central Asia for talks”. 204 Some months later, Ahmed Rashid told CNN
that among the Central Asian Countries “Uzbekistan had become the
favorite both of Russia and the USA, raising concern even in the neigh-
bors”. 205
However, also the other Countries of the region participated, more or
less actively, to the operations. In the previous paragraphs the offer of the
Kazakh and Kyrgyz airspace, later accepted by the USA, has already
been cited, as well as the alleged deployment of some troops also in
Tajikistan. There is no reason to think that those Republics, once Russia had
aligned on US positions, were not involved in the operations against the
Taliban. Turkmenistan’s stance remained mysterious; nevertheless, in
Russia there were rumors that President Niyazov had consigned to the
USA the Airport of Mary and, maybe, also that of Charzhou. 206 Other
sources added that “the United States and NATO have reliably asserted
themselves at Uzbek, Kirghiz and Tajik bases, i.e. Manas (Bishkek), Karshi,
Kulyab, Kokaidy, and Termez”, 207 while no mention was made of
Kazakhstan. 
A) Variables Involved
The Friendship Bridge, on the street linking
Termez in Uzbekistan with Mazar-i Sharif in
Afghanistan was for decades the only route con-
nection between the two Countries. Once connect-
ing the USSR territories with the Afghan quasi-protectorate, after
Uzbekistan’s independence it had almost become an internal infrastruc-
ture, linking the Country with the Afghan provinces ruled by the Uzbek
Warlord Dostum. However, after the Taliban’s campaign of 1997-98 cap-
turing northern Afghanistan, Karimov had decided to seal the bridge, that
remained officially closed for the next 4 years.
During the US military campaign in Afghanistan of Fall 2001, howev-
er, both international and non governmental organizations, and also
politicians such as the EU representatives started to ask for the reopening
of the Bridge to carry convoys of aid, more and more assertive with the
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progressive retreat of the defeated Taliban. Karimov agreed already in an
early phase of the War, on 25 October, to reopen the Termez Port and
Airport; 208 however, he resisted for several weeks to any pressure about
the Bridge. Only on the first days of December he finally came to the deci-
sion, when many factors had changed. 
Crucial for the decision was first of all the American pressure, evident-
ly witnessed by the announcement of the decision made in the press con-
ference after Karimov’s meeting with the US Secretary of State Colin Powell
(Bilateral). 209 There is no doubt that the US Administration, in turn pressed
by international organizations, NGOs, and by the American public opin-
ion itself about the need to give relief to the thousands of refugees dis-
placed by the war, desired this move from Tashkent. The fact that the same
request had previously been made to Karimov by European visitors, both
representing single Countries, and the European Union, until a week
before the decision 210 without success also shows the different degrees of
influence on the Uzbek administration of the USA and Europe. The other
reasons which made the decision possible are revealed by the conditio
sine qua non posed by Uzbekistan as necessary to reopen the Bridge:
Uzbek authorities had in fact insisted for weeks that their decision to keep
the bridge closed was based purely on security calculations. “As soon as
stability is restored in northern Afghanistan, we will consider opening the
bridge,” had said Uzbek Foreign Minister spokesman Bahomir Umarov.
Until the end of November, such precondition was not yet accomplished,
with huge bands of Taliban fighters still contending with the Northern
Alliance the possess of Mazar-i Sharif and Konduz. However, after the
capture of those cities, and especially after the slaughter made by the US
Forces of the last rebel Taliban fighters in the Kala i Jhangi fortress, which
took place in the last week of November, Uzbekistan’s further refusal could
but appear irrational. Now the risk of penetration of hostile Islamic forces
into Uzbekistan’s territory had dramatically decreased (Competing Elites),
while the first US ground operations in Afghanistan added to the Northern
Alliance control of Northern Afghanistan gave the major security required
(Military Capability). The Economic Capability factor also needs to be
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included: during the whole Afghan campaign, the Uzbek administration
never concealed that the other reward required (in addition to security)
was economic aid. The circumstance in which the Bridge was doomed to
reopening made no exception: both requirements were satisfied by Powell,
declaring: “our interests in this region should be permanent and these
relations will continue after the [Afghan] crisis”. Washington also pledged
to Tashkent $100 million in “additional economic and humanitarian aid
and assistance in the security sphere.” A further $50 million in credits was
promised through the Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank of the United States to
support Uzbek small and medium-sized businesses. 211
Among the Relevant variables, the first to be considered is Global, rep-
resented by the long-term efforts made by the United Nations to negotiate
the reopening of the Bridge, especially through the World Food Program
(WFP). 212 An important role was undoubtedly also played by Interest
Groups, both represented by the NGOs willing to increase the flow of aid
to Afghanistan, and by the Uzbek faction of Afghanistan, willing to put the
hands on the same supplies (General Dostum himself personally inspected
the first load sent on the other side of the border). 213
B) Decisional Flow
The immediate aftermath of the concession of the Uzbek bases to the
US Army, when requests to Uzbekistan did not yet include the Bridge issue,
was very fruitful. Just four days after the launching of the early air strikes
on Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and the USA released a joint statement
describing “the content of the agreement formalizing their bilateral coop-
eration in the fight against terrorism”, referring to the establishment of “a
qualitatively new relationship based on a long-term commitment to
advance security and regional stability”. 214 However, already a few days
later, observers noted the protests of US human rights activists against this
alliance. 215 Maybe conscious of such pressures, the Uzbek Government
allowed, on 25 October, the United Nations “to use a river port in the
southern city of Termez”, and opened the Termez airport to humanitarian
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organizations to allow the stockpile of humanitarian items. 216
Nevertheless, on 31 October, during a meeting with Belgian Foreign
Minister Louis Michel (on behalf of the EU’s current presidency), Karimov
ruled out to open the Bridge on Amu Darya “for humanitarian convoys in
the foreseeable future”. Worried about the situation in Afghanistan and
the perspective of a long war in the context of regional stability, Foreign
Minister Kamilov added that the Bridge would not be open “until the situ-
ation in northern Afghanistan stabilizes”. 217 Reports of those days refer of
a different strategy pursued by the USA and the European representatives:
according to The Guardian, while Britain and other Europeans wanted to
open up and secure routes into Afghanistan (such as the Termez crossing)
to provide humanitarian aid to millions of Afghans starving, the USA saw
the continuing hunt for Usama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network as the
overriding priority and did not want to do anything that could detract from
that effort. 218
The events of November changed the whole situation, beginning with
the Taliban’s defeat in Mazar-i Sharif (and the capture of the major cities
of the Country made by the Northern Alliance) and ending with the fall of
the last fundamentalist stronghold, Konduz. The massacre of the last
Taliban and al Qaeda fighters in the northern Provinces of Afghanistan
(made by the US and Northern Alliance troops near Mazar-i Sharif in the
last week of the month) further simplified the situation at Uzbekistan’s bor-
ders. Meanwhile, slowly implementing the October 25 agreement, on 14
November barges loaded with emergency supplies started to move from
the Termez port. 219 On 26 November the fall of Konduz was announced,
while the USA launched the first official operations with US ground
troops. 220 On 5 December a provisional Afghanistan’s Government led by
Hamid Karzai was formed; on the following day, the Uzbek Government
announced that it might soon open the Friendship Bridge connecting its
Country with Afghanistan. 221 On 7 December, after the meeting with US
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Secretary of State Colin Powell, also fixing new US financial aid to
Uzbekistan (see previous paragraph) the Uzbek Government announced
the decision to reopen the Friendship Bridge. 222
C) Implementation; Output; Comparison
The implementation of the decision began with an agreement signed
on 14 December by The Foreign Minister of Uzbekistan, Abdulaziz
Kamilov, and the United Nations Resident Coordinator in Uzbekistan,
Richard Conroy. The agreement set out a series of arrangements to facili-
tate humanitarian cross-border operations by air, rail and road, as well as
the movement of humanitarian staff across the border between Uzbekistan
and Afghanistan. Most importantly, the agreement expedited the delivery
of food, medicine, blankets, clothing and other essential, life-saving assis-
tance across the recently reopened Friendship Bridge. The United Nations
Joint Logistics Center and the Ministry of Emergency Situations would
jointly co-ordinate the passage of wagons and vehicles over the bridge
and arrange for the necessary clearances.223 However, the expedition of
aid went on very slowly, mainly because of the alleged bureaucratic and
technical obstacles put by Uzbek officers. Radio Free Europe / Radio
Liberty reported that the US Administration was frustrated by Uzbekistan’s
reluctance to implement the agreement about the bridge. It seems that also
during the third trip to the Country made by the US Secretary to Defense
Rumsfeld there were negotiations about the issue, but without great
progress.
The output of the decision was undoubtedly positive to Uzbekistan,
whose leadership, afraid of losing control on that critical borderpoint kept
a strict control over the situation. On the other hand, the decision allowed
Uzbekistan not to lose the favor of its new powerful ally, the USA, while
decreasing the hostility both of the US public opinion (the news about the
opening of the Bridge was widely broadcast by the major US media) and
of humanitarian organizations.
Among the other Central Asian Countries, the only two other ones with
a common border with Afghanistan are Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. The
former was the first in the region to reopen its border, probably willing to
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restart as soon as possible the advantageous economic exchanges with the
neighbor (who had emerged, with the Friendship Bridge closed, as the
leading aid conduit for the relief operations). Through the Turkmen route,
already in November, a huge amount of aid was shipped to Afghanistan,
although this route took four days, and was complicated by Turkmen visa
requirements. 224 Russian border guards instead reportedly built a pontoon
bridge across the Pyanj River, dividing Tajikistan and Afghanistan, also to
speed up aid into Afghanistan. The construction was funded by the
German government. 225
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224 Antoine Blua, “ Lack of Security in Afghanistan Sparks Recrimination over Humanitarian
Aid Distribution” Eurasia Insight”, 19 May 2002, from the Web Site
http://www.eurasianet.org
225 Bruce Pannier: “Afghanistan: as Kandahar Surrenders, Is Political Accord Unraveling?”,
6 December 2001, from the Web Site http://www.rferl.org
CHAPTER 6
Findings of the Research
Some of the interesting characteristics and
novelties included in the pattern proposed by
Brecher 226 have already been explained in the
Introduction to this research. Another one, maybe
the most relevant at all, is the method of data pro-
cessing provided by the study of decisions, which not only allows a qual-
itative analysis, but also a quantitative one, which will be developed in the
next paragraphs of this Chapter.
Such an opportunity originates from the structure of Brecher’s model, in
which a particular Degree of Relevance is attributed to each of the ten
Variables considered, in each of the decisions studied. This work, in par-
ticular, will follow the modified version of Brecher’s model elaborated by
Coralluzzo (in his book about the Italian Post-War foreign policy 227). The
first task of the researcher, as explained by Coralluzzo, is the preliminary
subdivision of the ten Variables into three categories (Crucial, Relevant,
Irrelevant) for each of the decisions analyzed (in the present work, the sub-
division has been done contextually with the study of every single deci-
sion). The second step is transforming each classification into a different
score attributed to the Variables (Crucial = 5; Relevant = 3; Irrelevant = 1).
After this operation, the analyst, by dividing the sum of all scores attrib-
uted to each Variable in the different decisions for the maximum score
obtainable, gets what Coralluzzo calls “Index of Relevance”. 228 The Index
of Relevance of a Variable will always be a number included between 0.2
(Variable Irrelevant in all the decisions under examination) and 1
(Variable always Crucial); more importantly, it will provide the researcher
with the opportunity to compare the weight of the different Variables in the
foreign policy decisions of a Country. Thus, the Variables with Relevance
Indexes ranging between 0.2 and 0.4 will be considered as globally
Irrelevant, those with Indexes between 0.4 and 0.6, Relevant, and those
above 0.6, Crucial.
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OF ANALYSIS
226 Brecher, 1972, op. cit.
227 Coralluzzo, op. cit.
228 Id.
However, as already demonstrated by Coralluzzo in his work, the
analysis can go far beyond this comparison of raw data, and provide
more accurate information about the decision-making process, both in dif-
ferent periods of time, and in different Issue Areas. The present research,
although with a more limited number of cases taken into account, tries to
follow his example, providing in Table 2 the analysis of the former and the
latter five years of Uzbekistan’s independent existence, and in Table 3 the
Variables relevance in the four Issue Areas, with separated Indexes of
Relevance for each of them.
Looking at Table 1, the first evident considera-
tion to make is that not all the Variables taken into
account appear as having the same weight on
decisions: some of them reach a very low score,
which can be judged undoubtedly as Irrelevant,
while others, on the contrary, appear as Crucial at
a first glance. This is the case, most of all, of the Variable Competing Elites,
reaching a score of 0.83 (derived from the Degree of Crucial attributed to
it in most of the decisions taken into account). It is necessary to remember
that this Variable, in the present research, works as an indicator of the
weight exercised by the radical Islamic movements on Uzbekistan’s foreign
policy. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the assumptions made in
literature about the attitude of Uzbekistan’s and, in general, of the post-
Soviet power elites (and, especially, about the ‘islamophobia’ of President
Karimov, as defined by Annette Bohr 229) are confirmed by the data. The
‘Islamic factor’ is probably the first to be taken into account by the Uzbek
leadership in nearly all kind of decisions.
A group of five other Variables reaches or even is over the threshold of
the category Crucial: Dominant Bilateral (influence of Russia; 0.67),
Bilateral (influence of other bilateral relations, mainly represented by the
USA; 0.67), Military Capability (0.67); Economic Capability (0.63); and
Regional System (0.60). Their balancing, in the complex, accurately
reflexes the policy of equilibrium pursued by President Karimov (between
the former colonizer and the new privileged partner, between economic
and military interests, and between regional and extra-regional dynam-
2. THE DATA 
AND THEIR 
INTERPRETATION
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ics). These data thus seem to confirm not only the qualitative results of this
research, but also the general opinion of authoritative scholars, such as
Boris Rumer (stating that Karimov’s two main objectives are to defeat
Islamic radicalism, and to establish himself as the principal leader of
Central Asia, through an unprejudiced and fluctuating foreign policy 230).
All these Variables are obviously often taken into account in foreign poli-
cy decisions, because each one of them corresponds to some vital interest
of the Republic: need of security, need of financial resources and of sup-
port to development, and relation with the old and the new privileged
international partner.
Among the Variables standing negatively against the others, first of all
we find Political System (0,3), proving the poverty of the Country’s polit-
ical life and activity: the Variable was irrelevant in nearly all decisions,
and when it was taken into account, it was never because of a normal
democratic activity, but because of other factors, such as dissidents in
exile. This characteristic of Uzbekistan’s political system, already previ-
ously noted in this research, is undoubtedly connected with a similar sit-
uation observed in civil society, despite the reported efforts made by
President Karimov to foster it. The low score of the Variable Interest
groups (0,43) reveals in fact the civil society’s lack of influence on deci-
sions, especially in the international field. Moreover, when the Variable is
taken into account, it is mostly because of the pressure exercised on the
Uzbek Government by the Uzbek minorities abroad, and rarely by west-
ern-style pressure groups.
The low score of Other Regional (0,37) is instead easily explained by
the preference generally accorded in Central Asia to bilateral relations, as
the privileged locus where to take important decisions. Thus, though some
of Uzbekistan’s efforts in the international field were directed toward the
European Union (especially when the USA looked reluctant to engage
themselves in a compromising partnership), the ASEAN Countries, and, at
least in the early 1990s, toward the Middle East Region, the dialogue with
these regions was mainly carried on with privileged national partners,
such as Turkey, Israel, Germany, Korea and Japan. The same for
International Organizations, generally with a rather negative relation with
Uzbekistan, testified by the very low score of the Variable Global System
(0.33).
LUCA OZZANO - UZBEKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY (1991-2001)
W
PAP
ER
S
ORKING
85
230 Rumer, 2000, op. cit., p. 44
Table 2 shows the differences in the Variables
Indexes of Relevance between the periods 1996-
2001 and 1991-95 revealing several significant
features, not pointed out by Table 1. In fact, while
some Variables present an almost identical profile
in both the five-year periods considered (for example Regional, Other
Regional, and Economic Capability, all with changes under 0.1), others
show significant shifts. This is the case of Competing Elites, which,
although already the highest score-Variable in the first period (0.73), pres-
ents an increase of 0.2, reaching (as showed in Table 2) the enormous
score of 0.93 in the years 1996-2001. This conclusive jump happened
after the terrorist attacks and incursions of 1999-2000, when the fight
against Islamic extremists became an absolute priority for the Uzbek
Government.
In this context, that Variable has first of all to be seen as in connection
with Military Capability, which gets the same maximum score in the post-
February 1999 decisions, increasing its score between the two periods by
0.13. This connection first of all comes from the need to find an adequate
protection from terrorists and incursors; not surprisingly, an increase of
0,27 is noted also in the Variable Bilateral, in the second period always
representative of the US influence. Another probable part of this net of
interconnections among Variables is the increase by 0.07 of Economic
Capability (only lowered by the decision about the Shanghai-5, which
barely involved economic factors). This is not a surprise, given that the
USA are seen in Uzbekistan not only as providers of security and stabili-
ty, but also of better financial conditions (the fact is also proved by the
direct US investments in the Country, the new big mining contracts, and the
improved attitudes of some international and financial organizations
toward the Republic in Fall 2001 and after).
The data observed in the Variable Bilateral are particularly signifi-
cant if compared to Dominant Bilateral, which loses 0.13 between the
two periods considered. These combined shifts of the two Variables
allow Bilateral to reach the same total value as Dominant Bilateral
(exceeded by 0.2 only in the second period). While Dominant Bilateral
already in the older decisions gets a high score (bringing it to the same
Index of Relevance as Competing Elites in the years 1991-1995),
Bilateral remains considerably lower, and gets its first high rates thanks
not the USA (then not involved in the region), but to the Turkish influence
(soon disappeared later). However, the second period just begins with
Karimov’s first official visit to the USA, and with the recognition (in
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IN TIME
1997) to Uzbekistan of the title of ‘privileged partner’ of the USA. Since
that moment (except for the Borders issue, which was merely regional)
the Variable Bilateral was crucial in every decision, always representing
mainly the US influence, while the Variable Dominant Bilateral under-
went an almost symmetric flexion. Maybe it is too soon to talk about a
change in Uzbekistan’s dominant bilateral relation; however, if the (both
military and economic) presence of the USA in the Country will contin-
ue steadily also after the end of the Afghan emergence (as some indi-
cators induce us to suspect), the geopolitical situation of the region will
never be the same it was before.
Finally, the last interesting datum in Table 2 is the enormous decrease
in Interest Groups’ Index, more than halved (from 0.6 to 0.27). This is a
sure evidence of the deterioration of civil liberties in the Country after
Karimov’s consolidation of power: while in the early times of independ-
ence the pressure of society was conclusive, for example, for the creation
of an independent National Army, and Relevant in some other cases, in
the decisions of years 1996-2001 the Variable is not completely Irrelevant
only thanks to the role played by the ethnic Uzbeks of Afghanistan in the
post-war situation.
As a final contribution to the comprehension of
the dynamics in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy deci-
sion-making, it is also worthwhile to examine the
Index of Relevance of the Variables in the four dif-
ferent Issue Areas (although, because of the very limited number of cases
taken into account for each area, the data in Table 3 are far less conclu-
sive).
In the Military-Security Issue Area – which alone accounts for 1/3 of the
total decisions – it is possible to see again the close connection between the
Variables Military Capability, and Competing Elites, respectively with a
score of 1 and 0.9. Bilateral and Dominant Bilateral both just reach the
threshold of the ‘crucial zone’ exactly with 0.6, while an even higher score
is got by Regional, which testifies the preeminent Central Asian dimension
of Uzbekistan’s perception of security. The other Variables, more or less, fol-
low the same patterns already observed in the main Tables.
The Cultural-Status Issue Area is the less represented, with only two
decisions; however, it allows to verify the importance of the Variable
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Competing Elites, crucial in both of them. An unusually low score is
reached instead by Economic and Military Capability, while the other
Variables are on their usual average.
On the other hand, the Economic-Monetary Issue Area presents a big
surprise, with Competing Elites just above the threshold of Relevance
(0.47). Although this peculiarity could be partially explained by the time
of the three decisions (all before 1999), these data prove that the Variable
Competing Elites, although strictly connected to most issues, is not Crucial
in economics. In other words, fighting Islamic radicalism has not been a
business for Uzbekistan and its leadership, at least until the events of Fall
2001 – which significantly altered this state of affairs. The best result
obtained by Bilateral and Dominant Bilateral (both with the maximum
score 1) shows, on the contrary, the deep connection of the economic mat-
ters with the international political orientation of the Country: all the deci-
sions taken into account proved in fact to be anti-Russia or pro-USA
stances taken by the Uzbek leadership. This testifies a use of economy, at
least in the international field, which is not always proper, and probably
not always positive for the Country (in the research, for example, we have
seen the reluctance of the Uzbek leadership to do business with some
Islamic Countries, because of fears of destabilization). A good result is got
here by the Variable Global, thanks to the nuclear non-proliferation issue
involved in the ‘Iranian Affair’ of 1995, while Military Capability never
proves relevant in economic matters.
The Issue Area Political-Diplomatic restores the leading role of the
Variable Competing Elites, reaching the maximum score 1, together with
Economic and Military Capability, and proves their importance in the
political dimension of Uzbekistan’s international relations. An high Index
(0.73) of the Variable Regional testifies again the prevailing Central Asian
dimension of the Country’s foreign policy (except in cultural and econom-
ic matters). This trend is confirmed also by the modest result of the
Variables relating to the two extra-regional Great Powers (Dominant
Bilateral and Bilateral), both at 0.47. It is also necessary to point out the
role of the international organizations which, at least in this Issue Area,
were able to get some influence on Uzbekistan’s stance both in the con-
clusion of the Tajik Civil War and of the Afghan War of 2001. These were
also the periods in which the international agencies were more involved in
the Central Asian affairs: maybe their low general score could also
depend on a lower involvement in other periods. Similar observations can
be made about Interest Groups.
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The events of Fall 2001, with the new factors
brought into the Central Asian situation, have van-
ified every possibility to build a pattern trying to
explain the external behavior of the Countries of
the region (especially one that can allow us to
foresee the future with a sufficient degree of certainty). However, this
research has outlined some basic features that could represent a useful
starting point for future researches, when the set up of powers in Central
Asia will be clarified.
The first certain result emerging from this work is that Islamic radical-
ism, perceived as the main threat to the existing order, represents the main
influence on Uzbekistan’s foreign policy decisions. Even after the defeat of
the Taliban, paradoxically, the opportunities for the situation to change
have probably decreased: Karimov’s ‘Islamophobia’ and anti-terrorism
stance have in fact become the main paradigm also of the superpower
which has become Uzbekistan’s closest ally, the USA.
In the view of the Uzbek leadership, this problem is closely associated
with that of the Country’s need for ‘stability and security’ (in Karimov’s
words). First of all, therefore, as long as the Islamic factor will be seen as
a threat, a major role in decisions will also be played by military and secu-
rity factors; moreover, there will be little probability of an improvement in
the degree of democratic development of the Republic, and of the emer-
gence of an alternative leadership other than the Islamic militants.
Thanks to the 2001 events, Uzbekistan has finally found the powerful
ally that President Karimov had been courting for years. Now the Country,
in the opinion of authoritative scholars, 231 is the focal point of the US pen-
etration in the post-War Central Asia. As this research demonstrated, the
Afghan War was the turning point of a process that could make the rela-
tion with the USA Uzbekistan’s new Dominant Bilateral Relation. The main
doubt in this situation is about the role of Russia: while a cooperative
option of strategic partnership might come true after Russia’s rapproche-
ment to NATO, there is also the possibility that Uzbekistan could become
in the future not only a fault zone between West and Islam, but also
between the US and Russian spheres of influence.
The main locus of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy for most of the ten years
examined was the region of Central Asia, much more than the Global
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231 Ahmed Rashid interviewed at the CNN, 21 March 2002
System, and also the extra-regional field. It is also without doubt that the
leadership of the Country, when possible, tried to get influence on the
neighbors (for instance, through military intervention in Tajikistan, or by
means of economic pressure on the Countries of the area). The question
mark is whether these hegemonic temptations of the Country could
become more real in the new regional geopolitical situation, making
Uzbekistan a danger for the weaker neighbors.
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TABLE 1 - Index of Relevance of Variables
G R OR DB B MC EC PS IG CE
Army (July 1992 MS) 1 3 3 3 1 5 1 1 5 3
Intervention in Tajikistan (Dec. 1992 MS) 1 5 1 1 1 5 5 3 3 5
Alphabet (Sept. 1993 CS) 1 3 5 5 3 1 1 1 3 5
Currency (July 1994 EM) 1 1 1 5 5 1 5 1 1 1
Peace in Tajikistan (Spring 1995 PD) 3 5 1 3 1 5 5 1 3 5
Embargo Iran (May 1995 EM) 5 1 1 5 5 1 1 1 3 3
Withdrawal Students (August 1997 CS) 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 5 1 5
Pipeline (Nov. 1998 EM) 1 5 3 5 5 1 3 1 1 3
Marking the Borders (August 1999 PD) 1 5 1 3 1 5 5 1 1 5
Adhesion to Shanghai-5 (Apr. 2001 MS) 1 3 1 5 5 5 1 1 1 5
Hosting US Troops (Oct. 2001 MS) 1 3 3 3 5 5 5 1 1 5
Friendship Bridge (Dec. 2001 PD) 3 1 1 1 5 5 5 1 3 5
TOTAL 20 36 22 40 40 40 38 18 26 50
DEGREE OF RELEVANCE 0,33 0,60 0,37 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,63 0,30 0,43 0,83
TABLES
Table 2 - Relevance in Different Periods of Time
G R OR DB B MC EC PS IG CE
Army (July 1992 MS) 1 3 3 3 1 5 1 1 5 3
Tajikistan 1 (Dec. 1992 MS) 1 5 1 1 1 5 5 3 3 5
Alphabet (Sept. 1993 CS) 1 3 5 5 3 1 1 1 3 5
Currency (July 1994 EM) 1 1 1 5 5 1 5 1 1 1
Tajikistan 2 (Spring 1995 PD) 3 5 1 3 1 5 5 1 3 5
Embargo Iran (May 1995 EM) 5 1 1 5 5 1 1 1 3 3
Total Period 1991-1995 12 18 12 22 16 18 18 8 18 22
Index of Relevance 1991-1995 0,40 0,60 0,40 0,73 0,53 0,60 0,60 0,27 0,60 0,73
Students (Aug. 1997 CS) 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 5 1 5
Pipeline (Nov. 1998 EM) 1 5 3 5 5 1 3 1 1 3
Borders (August 1999 PD) 1 5 1 3 1 5 5 1 1 5
Shanghai-5 (Apr. 2001 MS) 1 3 1 5 5 5 1 1 1 5
US Troops (Oct. 2001 MS) 1 3 3 3 5 5 5 1 1 5
Bridge (Dec. 2001 PD) 3 1 1 1 5 5 5 1 3 5
Total Period 1996-2001 8 18 10 18 24 22 20 10 8 28
Index of Relevance 1996-2001 0,27 0,60 0,33 0,60 0,80 0,73 0,67 0,33 0,27 0,93
Diff. Period 2-Period 1 -0,13 0,00 -0,07 -0,13 0,27 0,13 0,07 0,07 -0,33 0,20
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TABLE 3 - Variables Relevance in Different Issue Areas
G R OR DB B MC EC PS IG CE
MILITARY-SECURITY
Army (July 1992 MS) 1 3 3 3 1 5 1 1 5 3
Tajikistan 1 (Dec. 1992 MS) 1 5 1 1 1 5 5 3 3 5
Shanghai-5 (Apr. 2001 MS) 1 3 1 5 5 5 1 1 1 5
US Troops (Oct. 2001 MS) 1 3 3 3 5 5 5 1 1 5
Total Issue Area 4 14 8 12 12 20 12 6 10 18
Index of relevance 0,20 0,70 0,40 0,60 0,60 1,00 0,60 0,30 0,50 0,90
CULTURAL-STATUS
Alphabet (Sept. 1993 CS) 1 3 5 5 3 1 1 1 3 5
Students (August 1997 CS) 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 5 1 5
Total Issue Area 2 4 6 6 6 2 2 6 4 10
Index of relevance 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,60 0,60 0,20 0,20 0,60 0,40 1,00
ECONOMIC-MONETARY
Currency (July 1994 EM) 1 1 1 5 5 1 5 1 1 1
Embargo Iran (May 1995 EM) 5 1 1 5 5 1 1 1 3 3
Pipeline (Nov. 1998 EM) 1 5 3 5 5 1 3 1 1 3
Total Issue Area 7 7 5 15 15 3 9 3 5 7
Index of relevance 0,47 0,47 0,33 1,00 1,00 0,20 0,60 0,20 0,33 0,47
POLITICAL-DIPLOMATIC
Tajikistan 2 (Spring 1995 PD) 3 5 1 3 1 5 5 1 3 5
Borders (August 1999 PD) 1 5 1 3 1 5 5 1 1 5
Bridge (Dec. 2001 PD) 3 1 1 1 5 5 5 1 3 5
Total Issue Area 7 11 3 7 7 15 15 3 7 15
Index of relevance 0,47 0,73 0,20 0,47 0,47 1,00 1,00 0,20 0,47 1,00
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